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The first chapter is motivated by the recent territorial disputes, in South China Sea and the 
Middle East, over external territories rich in natural resources. The objective of the study is to 
understand why political disputes over external territories sustain or persist despite that the 
countries engaged in conflict are trading partners. This chapter presents a game theoretical model 
to analyze the impact of bilateral trade on the economic and political behavior of the two 
contending countries. The analytical results suggest that greater trade openness (by lowering trade 
cost) reduces conflict intensity when the contending countries are symmetric in their national 
endowments. This finding is consistent with the liberal peace hypothesis that trade reduces 
conflict. For the case where there are differences in national resource endowments, the analysis 
shows that the overall conflict may increase despite greater trade openness. This chapter has policy 
implications on the role of bilateral trade and size of an economy for conflict resolution. 
The second chapter considers trade regionalism and the endogeneity of security policy. 
Using a sequential-move game, this chapter is the first to characterize the endogeneity of security 
and trade policies in a three-country framework with two adversaries and a neutral third party. It 
has been shown that an FTA between two adversaries (i.e., “dancing with the enemy” in trade 
regionalism) has the strongest pacifying effect, followed by worldwide free trade. Second, the 
pacifying effect of worldwide free trade is stronger than that of the protectionist regime. Third, 
relative to all other regimes, an FTA between one of the adversaries and a neutral third party is 
conflict-aggravating. Furthermore, this chapter compares conflict intensities when instead there is 
a customs union (CU) and identify differences in implications between CU and FTA for interstate 
conflicts. 
  
The third chapter investigates the scenario of two enemy countries that do not engage in 
trade. The objective is to analyze what would be their optimal arming allocations for national 
defense when a politically neutral third party forms a free trade agreement (FTA) with only one of 
the adversaries (Single FTA), as compared to the case when the third party forms an FTA with 
each of them (Multiple FTAs). The major finding is that an FTA between a neutral third country 
and each of the adversary countries (despite that they do not trade) has a pacifying effect since the 
overall conflict intensity decreases. However, an FTA between the third country and only one of 
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Chapter 1 - A game Theoretical analysis of International Trade and 
Political Conflict over external territories  
 1. Introduction 
How does greater trade openness affect the arming decisions of large open countries that 
have political disputes over external territories (e.g., overseas islands or fishing grounds near 
coastal waters) whose property rights are not well defined or enforced, especially when the 
territories have a rich abundance of natural resources? Viewed from a different angle, how do 
conflicts over external resource-rich territories affect the trading relationship between two 
adversaries? In this paper, we attempt to explore those questions by developing a game-theoretic 
model of trade wherein two adversaries may engage in armed confrontation over resources in 
external territories. The scenario characterized by both economic interdependence through trade 
and political disputes about overseas resources serves as a heuristic framework for investigating 
the liberal peace hypothesis that trade has pacifying effects on interstate conflicts.  
 The present study is motivated by the renewed interest in the trade-conflict nexus 
associated with recent (or historical) interstate disputes over the sovereignty of certain external or 
overseas territories. One recent case of interest concerns China and Vietnam. Vietnam’s imports 
from China represent more than 30% of her total volume of imports. Also, China represents one 
of Vietnam’s most important trading partners. Yet their dispute over the parcels of land in the 
South China Sea, which are rich in valuable resources such as minerals and fishing grounds, has 
been in the headlines of political discussions between the two countries' officials for decades. 
Another case of interest involves the political conflict between Japan and Russia in connection 
with the southern Kuril Islands, which are rich in natural resources and have a sizable source of 
income from tourism. Despite the fact that Japan counts among the largest trading partners of 
2 
Russia, their disputes over the islands have not yet been resolved. The third case is an historical 
one relating to the Falklands Conflict (also known as the Falklands War) between Argentina and 
the United Kingdom over British overseas territories in the South Atlantic. Those territories are 
rich in oil and gas, among other valuable resources. These three cases, despite their differences 
when viewed from the political perspectives of territorial expansion and geopolitics, share two 
things in common from the economic perspectives of resource appropriation and international 
trade. One issue concern how conflict over external territories affect the trading relationship 
between two adversary countries, and the other concerns how greater trade openness affects the 
intensity of conflict (measured as the aggregate expenditures on armaments) between the 
adversaries. We make no attempt to analyze the historical origins or specific causes of territorial 
or resource conflicts. Rather, we wish to identify conditions under which the liberal peace 
proposition is valid when trading nations have conflicts over external territories rich in natural 
resources.  
Our analysis can be viewed as a subset of the broader picture regarding how globalization 
fostered by lower trade costs (i.e., a greater degree of economic interdependence owing to trade) 
affects interstate armed conflicts.1 Empirical research to study the correlation between 
international trade and political conflicts begins with Polachek (1980). Using panel data on 30 
countries for a period of ten years, the author shows that trade among nations significantly reduces 
the intensities of their conflicts. Following Polacheck’s (1980) seminal work, numerous 
researchers have turned their attentions to analyzing the general validity of the liberal peace 
                                                 
1See, e.g., Findlay and O’Rourke (2010), who discuss the general issues of natural resources, conflict and trade from 
an historical perspective. For other contributions that investigate resource-based disputes, see, e.g., Acemoglu, 
Golosov, Tsyvinski and Yared (2012), and Garfinkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2015). 
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hypothesis.2 The empirical findings in the literature do not reveal a high degree of consensus on 
the trade-conflict nexus, however.3 As a theoretical underpinning, Skaperdas and Syropoulos 
(2001) develop a conflict model of trade when two small open countries have disputes over a 
valuable resource (e.g., oil) indispensable for producing tradable goods. The authors show that 
when international price of the contested resource exceeds its autarkic price, the opportunity cost 
of arming declines. In that case, bilateral trade prompts competition for the disputed resource, 
causing each contending country's arming to increase. Garfinkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos 
(2015) present a variant of the Heckscher-Ohlin model to analyze interstate disputes over 
resources. They find that if trade promotes adversary countries to export goods that are intensive 
in disputed-resource, it may intensify interstate conflict so much that autarky is preferable to free 
trade. In analyzing the trade causes of war, Martin, Mayer and Thoenig (2008) find that expanding 
the number of member countries within a regional trade bloc reduces the economic dependency 
between any pair of adversaries which, in turn, makes war between them more likely. 
Starting with a conflict-theoretic framework of trade and external resource appropriation, 
we derive several new results that are summarized as follows. (i) For two large open countries that 
                                                 
2For studies that present empirical evidence on the correlation between trade, conflict and related issues, see, e.g., 
Polachek (1992), Barbieri (1996), Barbieri and Levy (1999), Reuveny and Kang (1998), Polachek, Robst and Chang 
(1999), Barbieri and Schneider (1999), Anderton and Carter (2001), Mansfield and Pollins (2001), (2002), Levy and 
Barbieri (2004), Kim and Rousseau (2005), and Glick and Taylor (2010).  
3The book by Mansfield and Pollins (2003) contains studies of the trade and conflict debate.  The contribution by 
Oneal and Russet (1999) supports Polacheck (1980) and shows that strengthening the extent of trade openness between 
contending countries effectively can reduce their conflicts in terms of overall armament expenditures.  Nevertheless, 
some studies (e.g., Kim and Rousseau 2005) find that the pacifying effect of greater trade openness can be neutral; 
other studies (e.g., Barbieri 1996) find that extensive trade linkages may increase the probability of armed conflicts.  
Barbieri and Levy (1999) show that war does not have significant impacts on trading relationships between 
adversaries.  
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have disputes over external territories rich in natural resources, each country's arming has three 
different effects. The first is an export-revenue effect since arming causes export prices and 
revenue to go up. The resulting increase in export revenue reflects the marginal revenue (MR) of 
arming. The second is an import-expenditure effect since arming cause import prices and spending 
to increase. The third is an output-distortion effect which causes domestic production of 
consumption goods to fall. The aggregation of the second and third effects reflects the marginal 
cost (MC) of arming. In a conflict equilibrium, each country's arming is determined endogenously 
by equating marginal revenue (MR) with marginal cost (MC). (ii) Based on the MR=MC 
conditions for determining the arming decisions of two resource-conflict countries, we show that 
greater trade openness (by lowering trade costs) reduces conflict intensity when the adversaries 
are symmetric in all dimensions (e.g., national endowments, production technology and consumer 
preferences). This finding provides a theoretical justification for the liberal peace hypothesis that 
trade reduces conflict. (iii) For the case where there are differences in national resource 
endowments, we show the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium at which arming by the more 
endowed country exceeds that by the less endowed country. The two adversaries respond to lower 
trade costs differently: the more endowed country cuts back on arming, whereas the less endowed 
country may increase arming. We find that, under resource endowment asymmetry, the overall 
intensity of arming may increase despite greater trade openness. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a conflict-theoretic 
model of trade between two countries having disputes over an external territory rich in resource 
inputs. We determine equilibrium arming for each country under symmetry in all aspects. In 
Section 3, we characterize trade and conflict equilibrium when two adversaries are different in 
5 
terms of national resource endowments. We then study how the resulting asymmetric equilibrium 
is affected by greater trade openness.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
 2. The analytical framework 
 2.1 Basic assumptions 
We consider a world of two countries (denoted A and B) having disputes over the property 
rights of a territory, which is located outside their respective national boundaries. The territory is 
either an island, a parcel of external land, or a newly discovered maritime fishing ground. This 
external territory is rich in valuable natural resource (e.g., minerals, fish and wildlife, natural gas, 
or oil), which can be used as an intermediate input by each country to produce a country-specific 
final good for domestic consumption or for exportation. We assume that the “undetermined” status 
of the external territory constitutes the primary cause of conflict between the two large open 
countries. 4 Our aim is to see how the adversaries determine their productive and appropriative 
activities, as well as the relationship between conflict and trade. 
Owing to their political disputes over the undetermined territory, country A (respectively, 
country B) chooses to produce 
AG  (respectively, )BG  guns for occupying the territory and, hence, 
obtaining the resource input for final good production. In the event of appropriation, the probability 
that each country is able to obtain the contested resource is represented by a canonical “contest 
success function” (CSF) that reflects the technology of conflict (see Tullock 1980; Hirshleifer 
1989; Skaperdas 1996) as follows: 
                                                 
4The modeling approach herein thus stands in contrast to the traditional assumption of "small open economies" in 
neoclassical international trade analysis, wherein trading nations accept the prices of tradable goods in their world 















for  0;A BG G+      (1a)
1
2
A B =  =
 
for 0.A BG G= =        (1b) 
Let the amount of natural resource endowment possessed by country ( , )i i A B=  be given as ,iR  
which is inalienable. Assume that the total amount of resource input in the external territory is 
( 0).Z   That resource input can be used by country A  to produce a consumption good, denoted 
as ;X on the other hand, the resource input can be used by country B  to produce a different 
consumption good, denoted as .Y  In other words, either A  or B  can utilize the external resource 
as an intermediate input in producing a country-specific product. The setup is analogous to the 
Ricardian world in which a single resource input is used by two countries to produce different 
tradable goods. 
For analytical simplicity and tractability, we assume that one unit of each country’s 
resource endowment is required to produce either one unit of its consumption good or one unit of 
armaments. In addition, one unit of the resource input is able to produce one unit of a country-
specific final good. Given the CSF in (1a) and in the event of fighting to acquire ,Z  country A's 
total production of final good X  is:  
( ) ,AA A A
A B
G




        (2a) 
where the last term measures the amount of the good produced from the appropriated resource 
input. Given the CSF in (1b), country B's total output of final good Y  is: 
( ) ,BB B B
A B
G




         (2b) 
where the last term is the amount of the good produced from the appropriated resource input. 
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As for consumer preferences in country ,A  we consider a symmetric quadratic utility 
function: 
2 2( , ) ( ) ( ) / 2,X Y X Y X YU D M D M D M= + − +  where XD  is consumption of the final good 
X produced domestically and YM  is consumption of the final good Y  imported from country B.  
Corresponding to the quadratic preferences, market demands for the domestic good X and the 
imported good Y in country A are:  
X XD P= −   and ,Y YM P= −        (3a) 
where ( 0)   is the quantity intercept, and XP  and YP  are, respectively, the domestic prices of 
final goods X and Y  in the country. We assume that 
 
is greater than the quantity of the endowed 
resource AR  
when market prices are zero, that is, .AR   
Likewise, we consider a symmetric quadratic utility function for country B as 
2 2( , ) ( ) ( ) / 2,Y X Y X Y XV D M D M D M= + − + where YD  is consumption of the final good Y
produced domestically and XM  is consumption of the final good X  imported from country A. 
Corresponding to the quadratic preferences, market demands for the domestic good Y and for the 
imported good X  in country B are: 
Y YD H= −   and ,X XM H= −        (3b) 
where   is the quantity intercept, and YH  and XH  are, respectively, the domestic prices of goods 
Y  and X  in the country.  We again assume that 
 
is greater than the quantity of the endowed 
resource BR  
when market prices are zero, that is, .BR   
Based on the market demands in (3a) and (3b), we calculate benefits to consumers in the 
two countries in terms of consumer surplus as follows:
 
2 21 ( )
2
A X YCS D M= +  and 
2 21 ( ).
2
B Y XCS D M= +      (4) 
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Producer surplus in country A (respectively, country B) is measured by the total value of final good 
production, X AP X  (respectively, ).Y BP Y  We have from AX  in (2a) and BY  in (2b) that  
[ ( ) ]AA X A A
A B
G




 and [ ( ) ].BB Y B B
A B
G




  (5) 
In the event of fighting between countries A and B for external resources, each country 
determines an arming allocation iG
 
to maximize its Social Welfare ( ),iSW which is specified as  
,i i iSW CS PS= +          (6)
 
where iCS and iPS  (for , )i A B=
 
are given in (4) and (5). We consider a simultaneous-move game 
in which countries A and B independently determine AG  and BG  
 
2.2 Trade and conflict equilibrium under symmetry 
We proceed to examine trade equilibrium in the presence of conflict over the external 
territory where resource Z
 
is located.  In the analysis, we incorporate the CSFs as specified in (1) 
into the Bagwell-Staiger (1997) framework of international trade between two large open 
economies. 
For country A, the production of good X, ,AX  minus domestic consumption, ,XD yields 
the amount of the good that country B imports, .XM  It follows from (2a), (3a) and (3b) that 
[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ).AA A X X
A B
G
R G Z P H
G G
 − + − − = −
+
     (7) 
For country B, the total production of good Y, ,BY  minus domestic consumption, ,YD  
yields the amount of the good that country A  imports, .YM  It follows from (2b), (3a) and (3b) that   
[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ).AB B Y Y
A B
G
R G Z H P
G G
 − + − − = −
+
     (8) 
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Denote it  as trade cost (per unit of output) that country i ( , )i A B= incurs when exporting 
a final good to the market in its rival. To maintain the trade patterns as described, we note the 
comparative advantage principle that a country exports a good whose price in its own domestic 
market plus unit trade cost can never exceed the good’s price in an importing country’s market.  
To satisfy this principle, we follow Bagwell and Staiger (1997) to impose the non-arbitrage 
conditions for bilateral trade in final goods X and Y:  
X X XP t H+   
and .Y Y YH t P+        (9) & (10) 
Making use of (7)-(10) and considering the equality conditions in (9)-(10) along with the 
symmetric assumption that ,X Yt t t= =  




































=  (11) 
where AX  and BY  are given in (2a) and (2b). As shown in Appendix A-1, we can further derive 
the equilibrium prices of the final goods, consumer surplus, and producer surplus in terms of 
arming by the two countries, AG  and .BG   
Substituting the market price XP  from (11) back into the market demand XD  in (3a) and 
making use of AX  in (2a), we calculate country A's domestic consumption of good X: 
2 1
( ) [ ( ) ] .




X t X Gt t





= − = + = + − +
+   






X A B B
A A B













     (12) 
Equation (12) shows that country A's arming has a negative effect on domestic consumption of 
good X, under the inequality condition that 2( )A B BZ G G G + . It is plausible to assume that this 
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inequality holds.5 The economic reason why the derivative X AD G   has a negative sign should 
be explained. When country A allocates more resources to arming, it has fewer resources available 
for producing good X. A reduction in the production of good X causes the good's market price to 
go up. Country A's consumption of good X thus declines along with its arming. 
Substituting the market price YP  from (11) into the demand function Y YM P= −  in (3a), 
making use of BY  in (2b), we calculate country A's import demand for good Y: 
2 1 1
( ) [ ( ) ] .
2 2 2 2 2
B A
Y B B B
A B
Y t Gt t





= − = − = + − −
+
 





A A A B
M P G Z
G G G G
 
= − = − 
  +
       (13) 
Equation (13) indicates that country A's arming negatively affects the consumption of good Y 
imported from its adversary. The economic reason is as follows. An increase in arming by country 
A forces country B to increase its arming. Country B then has fewer resources with which to 
produce its final good Y. The price of good Y will increase to reflect its scarcity. As a result, country 
A's import demand for good Y falls, explaining why A's arming affects its import demand 
negatively. 
Following ACS  in (4), we see that the effect of country A's arming on consumer surplus is: 








       (14) 
                                                 
5For the case of symmetry in all dimensions that shall be discussed in the latter part of this section, we see that this 
inequality condition implies that 4 ,Z G where .A BG G G= =  The inequality condition then indicates that 4.G Z
That is, each country's arming is strictly greater than a quarter of the nation’s overall resource endowment. 
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where the negative sign in (14) follows directly from (12) and (13). The result in (14) implies that 
A's arming affects domestic consumers negatively.  
As for the effect of A's arming on domestic producers, we have from APS  in (5) that 















A A B B
A A B











X A B B
A A B













  (16) 
When allocating more resources to arming, country A has fewer resources available for producing 
good X. The export price of good X will rise owing to its scarcity. The two derivatives in (16) are 
opposite in sign, causing the derivative A APS G   in (15) to be indeterminate. We cannot 
conclude unambiguously how domestic producers in country A is affected by its arming. 
 
 2.3 Decomposing the impact of a country's arming  
We proceed to analyze how arming affects the social welfare for each country. We look at 
country A first. Making use of A ACS G   in (14) and A APS G   in (15), we show in Appendix 
A-2 the detailed derivation for the impact of country A's arming on its social welfare ( )ASW  and 
record the result as follows: 
  Export-revenue effect Import-expenditure effect Output-distortion
           of arming                 of arming
                (+)                   (-)
( )A X Y AX Y X
A A A A
SW P P X
E M P
G G G G
   
= + − +
   
 effect
          of arming
                (-)
  (17) 
where ( )X A XE X D −  is the amount of the final good X exported from A to B. 
12 
Following from (17), we find that a country's arming contains three different terms. (i) The 
first term shows that country A's arming increases its export revenue since ( ) 0X A XE X D= −   
and 0.X AP G    This first term measures the marginal revenue of arming. (ii) The second term 
shows that country A's arming increases its expenditure on imports from the rival country since 
the import price increases, 0.Y AP G   (iii) The third term shows that country A's arming reduces 
final good production since 0.A AX G    The sum of the last two terms (in absolute value) 
measure the marginal cost of arming. We thus have 
PROPOSITION 1. For the case of bilateral trade and conflict over an external territory rich in 
a valuable resource input, the impact of a country's arming contains three separate effects. The 
first is an export-revenue effect since arming causes export prices and revenue to go up. This effect 
constitutes the marginal revenue of arming ( ).ArmsiMR  The second is an import-expenditure effect 
since arming causes export prices and spending to increase. The third is an output-distortion effect 
since arming reduces domestic production of consumption goods. The last two effects constitute 
the marginal cost of arming ( ).ArmsiMC  
Proposition 1 indicates that arming by each contending country to maximize its social 
welfare is determined where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. That is, .Arms Armsi iMR MC=  
It is straightforward to see the following corollary: 
Corollary 1: For two adversaries, the best option is not to fight over an external territory if arming 
is such that .Arms Armsi iMR MC  The result is a corner solution with 0.A BG G= =  This corner 
solution arises when the export-revenue effect is more than offset by the import-expenditure effect 
plus the output-distortion effect.  
Proof: See Appendix A-3.         Q.E.D. 
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The implication of Corollary 1 is as follows. Under the circumstances where 
,Arms Armsi iMR MC  the best strategy for two adversary countries is to maintain the "status quo" 
without claiming the property rights of an external territory and its resources. This may help 
explain why not all disputes over external territories (with undetermined property rights) give rise 
to militarized interstate conflicts.   
We consider the case of symmetry in endowed resources ( )A BR R R= = and trade costs 
( )A Bt t t= =  
when there is an interior solution for arming. Using the FOCs for countries A and B 
and the Arms Arms
i iMR MC=  conditions (see Appendix A-2), we solve for the Nash equilibrium level 
of arming for each country under symmetry ( ).A BG G G= =  This exercise yields  
6 5 8 2
,
12
R Z t K
G
 + − + +=         (18) 
where 2 2 2 236 12 24 96 20 32 4 32 64 .K R RZ Rt R Z Zt Z t t   = + + − + + − + − +  It can be verified 
that 0G   if 2 2 ,R Z +  which implies that 2.R Z −  We assume that this inequality 
condition holds.6  
 
 2.4 Comparative statics of the equilibrium arming under symmetry 
It is instructive to see how each country's equilibrium arming is affected by exogenous 
changes in the values of Z, R, and t. Making use of G  in (18), we show the following results (see 
detailed derivatives in Appendix A-4): 
                                                 
6At the equilibrium level of arming where 0,G
   we also verify that the equilibrium prices and quantities 




















            
The economic implications of the derivatives are summarized in the second proposition:  
PROPOSITION 2. Under symmetry, the equilibrium arming by each contending country 
increases with the amount of the contested resource in an external territory, increases with each 
country's national endowment, but decreases with the size of trade costs.  
Given trade costs, we see from Figure 1.1 that point E is the intersection of country A's 
arming reaction curve, denoted as ( ),
S
A BG G  and country B's arming reaction curve, denoted as 
( ).SB AG G
7 The symmetric arming equilibrium occurs at point E, 
* *{ , },A BG G  which is lying on the 
45-degree degree line. An exogenous increase in the amount of the contested resource Z  causes 
country A's arming reaction curve to shift outward and country B's arming reaction curve to shift 
upward. In equilibrium, the contending countries increase their arming allocations, i.e., 
'





BG  > 
*
BG . 
                                                 
7Note that country A's arming reaction curve, ( ),
S
BA
G G  is implicitly defined by its FOC that 0A AG  =  and 
country B's arming reaction curve, ( ),
S
ABG G  is implicitly defined by its FOC that 0.B BG  =  
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Figure 1.1 An external territory with a greater amount of resource causes each country's 
arming to increase under symmetry 
 
Figure 1.2 presents a graphical interpretation of the result that decreases in trade costs reduce the 
intensity of conflict. When trade costs are lower, A's arming reaction curve shifts leftward and B's 
arming reaction curve shifts download. The equilibrium arming allocations of the two adversaries 
are such that 
''
AG  < 
*
AG  and 
"
BG  < 
*
BG . These results suggest that the equilibrium arming 
allocations under symmetry are fundamentally "strategic complements" in response to lower trade 
costs. Figure 1.2 thus illustrates the validly of the liberal peace proposition that greater trade 
















Figure 1.2 Decreases in trade barriers cause each country's arming to decline under 
symmetry 
 
 3. Trade and conflict under asymmetry in national resource endowments 
No countries are identical in terms of national resource endowments. In this section, we 
analyze the more general case where two adversaries fighting for an external resource-rich territory 
differ in their endowments of resources. In terms of the notations in our analysis, we have .A BR R  
Two questions we wish to answer: one is how the resource endowment asymmetry affects the 
arming decisions of two contending countries, the other is how the resulting equilibrium is affected 
by greater trade openness owing to lower trade costs. Answers to these questions have implications 
for whether the liberal peace proposition continues to hold under asymmetry in national resource 
endowments.  
 3.1 Effects of resource endowment asymmetry on arming and conflict intensity    
Without loss of generality, we introduce a new parameter   by assuming that 
















world and ( 0).   The difference between AR  and BR is then given as 2 0,A BR R − =   which 
implies the assumption that country A is relatively more endowed country B.8 An increase in the 
value of  ( 0)   reflects that the degree of endowment asymmetry increases. 
As in Section 2, we continue to assume that the adversary countries engage in trade. 
Substituting the conditions that ( )A oR R = +  and ( )B oR R = −  into the consumer and producer 
surplus functions of the two countries (see equations a.5 and a.6 in Appendix A-1), we show in 
Appendix A-5 their social welfare functions: ( , ; )A A BSW G G   and ( , ; ).B A BSW G G   The countries 
determine arming levels to maximize their respective social welfare functions. The FOCs are:  







   
and  








    (19a) & (19b)
 
The FOC in (19a) defines A's arming reaction function to the arming level chosen by B, that is, 
( ; ).A A BG G G =  The FOC in (19b) defines B's arming reaction function to the arming level chosen 
by A, that is, ( ; ).B B AG G G =  
Given the value of ,  the two reaction functions determine the 
equilibrium arming allocations, { , },A BG G  
of countries A and B under asymmetry.  
Next, we evaluate the asymmetric equilibrium, { , },A BG G  
using the symmetric equilibrium 
as the baseline. This is due to the analytical intractability of finding the reduced-form solutions for 
AG  and .BG  For   being equal to zero such that ,A B oR R R= =  we have the symmetric arming 
allocations chosen by A and B, * *{ , },A BG G  
where * * .A BG G=  
Figure 1.3 illustrates this symmetric 
                                                 
8The parameter   may be used to represent the country size differential between A and B in that the higher the value 
of   the greater the size of country A relative to country B.   
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equilibrium at point E which lies on the 45-degree degree line.  Point E is the intersection of A's 
arming reaction curve, ( ),
S
A BG G  and B's arming reaction curve, ( ).
S
B AG G  
 
Figure 1.3 Conflict intensity may increase under national endowment asymmetry 
 
Under endowment asymmetry ( 0),   we need to determine what effects an exogenous increase 
in   have on the two derivatives: ( , ; )A A B ASW G G G  and ( , ; ) .B A B BSW G G G   Making 
use of ( , ; )A A BSW G G   in Appendix A-5, we find that 
2
2
( , ; ) 3( ) 2
0
4( )
A A B A B B
A A B




  + −
=  
  + 
.     (20) 
The positive sign in (20) indicates that country A's marginal benefit of arming,
( , ; ) ,A A B ASW G G G   increases with .  Country A is better off to arm more when the degree 
of endowment asymmetry increases, given the arming level chosen by its rival. As illustrated in 
Figure 3, an increase in the degree of endowment asymmetry causes country A's arming reaction 
curve to move rightward to the one as shown by ( ).
N

















On the other hand, making use of ( , ; )B A BSW G G   in Appendix A-5, we find that 
2
2
( , ; ) 3[( ) ]
0
4( )
B A B A B A
B A B




  + −
= −  
  + 
.    (21) 
The negative sign in (21) indicates that country B's marginal benefit of arming,
( , ; ) ,
B A B B
SW G G G   decreases with .  Country B is better off by reducing arming when the 
degree of endowment asymmetry increases, given the arming level chosen by its rival. As can be 
seen from Figure 3, an exogenous increase in   causes country B's arming reaction curve to move 
downward to the one as shown by either 1 ( )
N
ABG G  or 
2 ( ).
N
ABG G  
There are two interesting possibilities for the asymmetric equilibrium, depending on the 
relative shifts of the two countries' arming reaction curves. For illustration, we let A's arming 
reaction curve be given as ( ).
N
A BG G  The two possible cases of interest are: 
Case 1: The asymmetry equilibrium occurs at point 1,H which is the intersection of ( )
N
A BG G  and 
1 ( ).
N
ABG G  This implies that 
* ,A AG G  
* ,B BG G  
and 
* * .A B A BG G G G+  +  
Case 2: The asymmetry equilibrium occurs at point 2 ,H  
which is the intersection of ( )
N
A BG G  and 
2 ( ).
N
ABG G  This implies that 
*ˆ ,A AG G  
*ˆ ,B BG G  
and 
* *ˆ ˆ .A B A BG G G G+  +  
Conflict intensity is relatively lower in Case 2, but is relatively higher in Case 1. Note that, 
irrespective of the possible outcomes, the asymmetric equilibrium always occurs at a point below 
the 45-degree line such that A BG G  
and ˆ ˆ .A BG G  
We thus have 
PROPOSITION 3. Under asymmetry in national resource endowments between two adversaries, 
other things being equal, the equilibrium arming is greater for the relatively more-endowed 
country than for the relatively less-endowed country. The overall conflict intensity under the 
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endowment asymmetry is greater than that under endowment symmetry, provided that the increase 
in arming by the relatively more-endowment country outweighs the decrease in arming by the 
relatively less-endowment country. 
Proposition 3 implies that national endowment asymmetry does not necessarily lower the 
intensity of conflict. This suggests that whether a world with two asymmetric adversaries is "safer" 
than a world with two symmetric adversaries cannot be determined unambiguously. 
 
 3.2 Effects of greater trade openness under endowment asymmetry 
We proceed to analyze how an asymmetric equilibrium is affected by lowers trade costs. 
First, we see that the derivative of  ( , ; )A A B ASW G G G   with respect to t is:
( )
( ) ( )
2
2 2
Export-revenue effect Import-expenditure effect 
of arming as  decreases  of arming as  decreases  
                  (-)                
( , ; )
4 4
A B BA A B B
A A B A B
t t
G G G ZSW G G G Z
t G G G G G
 + − 
= − + 






of arming as  decreases












where ( , ; )A A BSW G G   is given in Appendix A-5. Combining the terms on the RHS of (22a) yields  










       (22b) 
It follows from (22b) that the slope ( , ; )A A BSW G G   with respect to AG  decreases as t  decreases. 
This impels that, when lower trade costs are lower, the export-revenue effect of arming is 
dominated by the import-expenditure effect plus the output-distortion effect of arming. In other 
words, lower trade costs will reduce the marginal benefit of arming relative to the marginal cost. 
As a result, country A's incentive to arm decreases. In Figure 4, the decrease in arming by country 
A is illustrated by a leftward shift of its reaction curve from ( )NA BG G  to 
'( )NA BG G . 
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Figure 1.4 Greater trade openness may increase conflict intensity 
under national endowment asymmetry 
 
Second, we examine how country B's arming affects its social welfare owing to lower trade 
costs and calculate the derivative of ( , ; )B A B BSW G G G   with respect to t
( )
( ) ( )
2
2 2
  Export-revenue effect Import-expenditure effect 
of arming as  decreases  of arming as  decreases  
                  (-)              
( , ; )
4 4
A B AB A B A
B A B A B
t t
G G G ZSW G G G Z
t G G G G G
 + − 
= − + 
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( )( ) 0.
4
A B AB A B
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G G G ZSW G G
t G G G
 + − 
= −  =  
  + 
    (23b) 
It follows from (23b) that the sign of the derivative cannot be determined unambiguously. This 















decreases. Accordingly, greater trade openness may cause country B's arming reaction curve to 
shift upward or downward, depending on the degree of endowment asymmetry. 
When trade costs are lower, we cannot rule out the possibility that the sum of the output-
distortion effect and the export-revenue effect is dominated by the import-revenue effect. If the 
marginal benefit of arming ( ( , ; ) )B A B BSW G G G   increases when t decreases, the best strategy 
for country B is to increase arming. Figure 4 illustrates the case where country B's arming reaction 
curve shifts upward from ( )NB AG G  to 
'( ).NB AG G  The reaction curves 
'
( )NA BG G  and 
'( )NB AG G  
determine the new asymmetric equilibrium at a point like 
'
1.H  Comparing 
'
1H  to the original 
equilibrium at 1 ,H  we see that 
'
AG < AG , 
'




BG > AG + BG . In this case, A reduces 
arming whereas B increases arming. Moreover, the intensity of conflict increases despite lower 
trade costs. Although there is a decrease in arming by A (the more-endowed country), its arming 
continues to exceed the arming level by B (the less-endowed country). We, therefore, have 
PROPOSITION 4. Under asymmetry in national resource endowments, greater trade openness 
resulting from lower trade costs causes the more endowed country (A) to cut back on its arming.  
But the effect on the arming level of the less endowed country (B) can be positive, zero, or 
negative. The impact of greater trade openness on conflict intensity is then indeterminate. 
The economic implications of Proposition 4. is as follows. In a world where conflicting 
countries differ in their resource endowments, they respond to lower trade costs differently. The 
relatively more abundant country reduces arming. But the relatively less abundant country may 
increase it. This result emerges when the decrease in the marginal revenue of arming is more than 
offset by the decrease in the marginal cost. Consequently, the overall conflict intensity could 
increase despite greater trade openness. The liberal peace hypothesis that trade reduces conflict 
may not be observed under resource endowment asymmetry. 
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 4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have presented a game-theoretic analysis to investigate how political 
disputes over an external territory affects the trading relationship between two resource-conflict 
countries and how greater trade openness affects the intensity of arming. Instead of imposing the 
small-open-economy assumption, we consider trade between two large open economies under 
resource conflict when terms of trade are endogenously affected by their arming decisions. We 
show that a country's arming raises its revenue from exports, increases its spending on imports, 
and lowers the production of civilian goods for domestic consumption. These three different 
effects of arming jointly determine how resource conflict affects the equilibrium volumes of 
imports and exports between two adversaries, and how greater trade openness affects their optimal 
arming choices. For the case in which two adversaries are symmetric in all aspects, our analysis 
demonstrates the validly of the liberal peace proposition that trade reduces conflict. 
We further analyze how conflict equilibrium is affected by differences in national resource 
endowments. The result is an asymmetric equilibrium such that the more endowed country arms 
more than the less endowed country. But the two adversaries respond to lower trade costs 
differently: the more endowed country is interested in arms reduction, whereas the less-endowed 
country may be interested in arms buildup. Under endowment asymmetry, conflict intensity could 
increase despite greater trade openness. 
It should be mentioned that the analysis with this paper is a subset of the broader issues 
concerning how movement toward globalization through trade affect international conflicts. In our 
model, we look at the effect that conflict over external territories has on trade in final goods 
between two adversaries, without considering the possibility of trade in resources or intermediate 
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inputs. This research question remains open for future investigation. The present model of conflict 
and trade adopts the simple assumption that one unit of resource or intermediate input is required 
to make one unit of a country-specific final product. In reality, two contending countries may not 
have the same capacity to utilize resource. Admittedly, we focus our analysis only on the case of 
endowment asymmetry without considering the aspect of capacity asymmetry. One interesting 
extension is to see how differences in the capacity of resource utilization would affect the validity 
of the liberal peace hypothesis. Another dimension we ignore is the strategic intervention of a third 
country into the two-country trade and conflict over external resources.9 We wish to pursue all 










                                                 
9
Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2015) examine the case where two adversaries do not trade with each other but do engage 
in trade with a third country.  For issues on how the equilibrium outcome of a two-party conflict is altered by the 
strategic involvement of an outside party, see Chang, Potter, and Sanders (2007), Chang and Sanders (2009), Sanders 
and Walia (2014). But these three studies do not consider the possibility of bilateral trade between adversaries. 
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Chapter 2 - Endogenous Security, Optimal Tariffs, and Regional 
Trade Agreements: Is Trade Regionalism a Double-Edged Sword? 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Introduction 
The post-World War II era has witnessed an unprecedented proliferation of regional trade 
agreements (RTAs), particularly in the types of free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions 
(CUs).10  Voluminous studies in the economics literature have contributed to our understanding of 
RTAs. Baldwin (1997) and Whalley (1998) analyze the economic determinants of forming or 
joining RTAs. Vicard (2009) shows empirically that forming any RTAs granting trade preferences 
to member states significantly increases bilateral trade.11 Carrere (2006) documents that RTAs 
have increased the volume of trade for member states, but at the expense of non-member states. 
Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012) investigate whether FTAs contribute to the rapid spread of 
regionalism and find no significant evidence of slowing down multilateralism. Bagwell, Bown, 
and Staiger (2016) present a systematic review of issues related to preferential trade agreements, 
as well as on the perils and promise facing the world trading system. This important strand of the 
literature on forming trade institutions stresses, among other things, the deeper integration benefits 
associated with RTAs from the perspective of international economics.12  
                                                 
10 Under either an FTA or a CU, member countries enjoy duty-free access to each other's markets within the trade 
bloc. An FTA allows member states to independently set external tariffs on imports from non-member states (i.e., 
outsiders), but members of a CU jointly determine a common external tariff on imports from outsiders. 
11
 The pioneering work of Viner (1950) provides economic insights into the trade-creation and trade-diversion effects 
of a customs union. Balassa (1961) indicates that there are four different stages of economic integration - free trade 
area or arrangement, customs union, common market, and economic union. Depending on the depth of economic 
integration through forming RTAs, Vicard (2009) examines four different types: preferential arrangements, free trade 
agreements, customs unions, and common markets.   
12
 For other studies on economic integration through RTAs and related issues see, e.g., Bhagwati and Panagariya 
(1996), Bagwell and Staiger (1997, 1989), Ethier (1998), Krishna (1998), Mansfield (1998), Mansfield and Milner 
(1999), Panagariya (2000), Baier and Bergstrand (2004), Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Egger and Larch (2008), 
Freund and Ornelas (2010), Chang and Xiao (2013, 2015), Anderson and Yotov (2016), Bergstrand, Egger, and Larch 
(2016), and Braymen, Chang, and Luo (2016). 
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During the post-World War II period over which many states are moving toward 
globalization as reflected by to the rapid growth in the number of RTAs, there is a somewhat steady 
but essentially declining trend of militarized interstate disputes.13 This observation prompts one to 
analyze whether trade regionalism is a double-edged sword: it increases the opportunity costs of 
going to war and, in the meanwhile, raises a nation's capacity to wage war for more resources. 
Given that RTAs are institutional arrangements across different countries, the other strand of the 
literature on trade regionalism further look at issues on interstate disputes, national security, 
democratization, arms race, and alliances. The work of Mansfield and Bronson (1997) is among 
the first to show that allied nations engage in a higher volume of trade than those non-allied. The 
authors further find that the relatively higher trade volume also increases when the allies form 
RTAs. Investigating the relationship between trade institutions and military conflicts, Mansfield 
and Pevehouse (2000) document that member states of RTAs are less likely to have armed conflicts 
than non-member states. Liu and Ornelas (2014) show empirically that a country's participation in 
FTAs enhances the sustainability of its democracy. The authors indicate that the mechanism 
behind the positive relationship between trade regionalism and consolidated democracy is “the 
destruction of rents in FTAs” associated with a member state's change in its political regime. 
Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig (2008, 2012) analyze the causes of trade for war and find that 
enlarging the number of members in a regional trade arrangement reduces the economic 
interdependence between any pair of rival states which, in turn, increases the likelihood of bilateral 
war.14 A recent study by Hadjiyiannis, Heracleous, and Tabakis (2016) shows how an RTA (either 
                                                 
13 See, for example, the detailed discussions in Harrison and Wolf (2012) and Gleditsch and Pickering (2014).   
14
 For studies that empirically analyze the correlation between trade and conflict-related issues see, e.g., Polacheck 
(1980), Polachek (1992), Barbieri (1996), Barbieri and Levy (1999), Reuveny and Kang (1998), Polachek, Robst, and 
Chang (1999), Barbieri and Schneider (1999), Anderton and Carter (2001), Mansfield and Pollins (2001), Reuveny 
(2002), Levy and Barbieri (2004), Kim and Rousseau (2005) and Polachek and Seiglie (2007), Glick and Taylor 
(2010). The book by Mansfield and Pollins (2003) contains a collection of interesting studies on trade and conflict 
debate. The seminal work of Polacheck (1980) shows that strengthening the extent of trade openness between 
contending countries can effectively reduce their conflicts in term of overall armament expenditures. This result is 
also found in Oneal and Russet (1999). Nevertheless, some studies such as Kim and Rousseau (2005) find that the 
pacifying effect of greater trade openness can be neutral. Other studies such as  Barbieri (1996) find that extensive 
links through trade may increase the probability of armed conflicts. Barbieri and Levy (1999) show that war does not 
have significant impact on trading relationships between adversaries. It seems that there is no consensus on the trade-
conflict nexus. For theoretical investigations on the relationship between trade and conflict see, e.g., Skaperdas and 
Syropoulos (2001), Garfinkel, Skaperdas, and Syropoulos (2009, 2015), and Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2017). 
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an FTA or a CU) between two contending countries or between one of the contending countries 
and a third neutral state affect the likelihood of war. 
The present paper belongs to the second strand of the literature on interstate conflicts and 
trade institutions. We analyze several questions that appear not to have been explored analytically 
in the economics literature. Under different trade regimes (e.g., RTAs, worldwide free trade, and 
trade protectionism), how do optimal military decisions of resource-conflict countries affect their 
terms of trade, export revenues, import demands, and tariff revenues? Given that forming trading 
blocs negatively affects non-member states economically (Carrere, 2006), how would RTAs affect 
conflict intensity between member and non-member countries that are enemies to each other? Do 
commitments to regional economic integration arrangements through trade have a role in reducing 
conflict intensity between enemy countries within a trade bloc? That is, does the relationship 
between military conflict and trade hinge on the form of trading institutions (either an FTA or a 
CU) for economic integration? Under the shadow of resource appropriations, would the world be 
much safer (that is, conflict intensity is relatively lower) when there is worldwide free trade than 
when there is an RTA? We wish to present an economic analysis that combines elements of 
interstate disputes and trade to identify conditions under which trade regionalism may or may not 
be a double-edged sword. Furthermore, among the alternative trade regimes to be analyzed, we 
wish to identify the one that exhibits the most substantial pacifying effect (i.e., conflict intensity 
is at the lowest level in equilibrium).  
The present paper departs from the conflict and trade regionalism literature in some 
important aspects. First, we present a game-theoretic framework of conflict and trade to 
characterize the endogeneity of arming decisions and trade policies optimally chosen by two 
adversary countries in a sequential-move game. Second, the endogenous security approach makes 
it possible to rank conflict intensities for different trade regimes. We investigate the equilibrium 
arming decisions of two adversaries in trade regionalism, as compared to their arming allocations 
under the protectionist regime (without RTAs of any form) or under worldwide free trade. Third, 
the analysis helps clarify some similarity or difference in implications between FTAs and CUs for 
the endogeneity of conflict intensities. Treating arming as an endogenously-determined decision 
in the shadow of conflict, we show for the protectionist regime (the benchmark case) that a 
country's arming affects its social welfare in four different channels. The first is an export-revenue 
effect, which increases welfare as an increase in arming causes its export price and revenue to go 
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up. The second is a resource-appropriation effect, which increases welfare as allocating more 
resource to arming increases the appropriation of final good for domestic consumption. The third 
is a tariff-revenue cum import-spending effect, which reduces welfare as an increase in arming 
raises import price, lowers import demand, and reduces tariff revenue net of import spending. The 
fourth is an output-distortion effect, which reduces welfare as increasing arming causes the 
production of civilian goods to go down.15 
We show that conflict intensities, measured by aggregating the arming allocations of the 
adversaries, are ranked from low to high for the different trade regimes: (i) a free trade agreement 
(FTA) between two adversaries, (ii) worldwide free trade, (iii) tariff protectionism, and (iv) an 
FTA between one of the adversaries and a neutral third country. These results have implications 
for conflict and trade. First, an FTA between two adversaries (i.e., “dancing with the enemy” in 
trade regionalism) has the strongest pacifying effect, followed by worldwide free trade. Second, 
the pacifying effect of worldwide free trade is stronger than that of the protectionist regime. Third, 
relative to all other regimes, an FTA between one of the adversaries and a neutral third country is 
conflict-aggravating as the aggregate intensity of arming the highest. We further compare conflict 
intensities when there is a customs union (CU) instead and identify differences in implications 
between CU and FTA for interstate conflicts. We find that conflict intensity remains at the lowest 
level (i.e., the pacifying effect is the strongest) whether two contending countries form an FTA or 
a CU. We also find that the conflict-escalating effect associated with an FTA between one of the 
adversaries and a neutral third country may disappear when there is instead a CU.  
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we first lay out a three-
country model of conflict and trade and then characterize the equilibrium under trade 
protectionism. In Section 3, we examine the scenario where two contending countries form an 
FTA to access each other's market duty-free. In Section 4, we focus on the case of worldwide free 
trade. Section 5 discusses the conflict-trade equilibrium when there is an FTA between one 
contending country and a neutral third party. We present a systematic ranking of optimal arming 
and conflict intensities for the alternative trade regimes. In Section 6, we analyze and compare the 
                                                 
15 The first two effects constitute the marginal revenue (MR) of arming, whereas the last two effects measure the 
marginal cost (MC) of arming. 
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equilibrium levels of conflict intensities for the trade regimes when RTA takes the form of a CU. 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
 2. The Analytical Framework of a Three-Country World  
 2.1 Basic assumptions on conflict, market equilibrium, and domestic welfare  
We consider a world of three countries, A, B, and C, where A and B are “enemies” as they 
contest part of each other's resources, and C is a neutral third party. Each country possesses R  
units of a unique resource input exclusively used in the production of a country-specific 
consumption good. We wish to incorporate elements of conflict into a standard framework of 
international trade for analyzing trade among the three large opening economies.16 This approach 
permits us to investigate how optimal arming decisions of two resource-conflict countries affect 
the equilibrium terms of trade across the three trading nations.17   
We assume that there are three different consumption goods: ,  ,a b  and .c  Each country 
specializes in the production of a tradable good in its country name, and imports two other products 
from abroad. For example, country A produces good a  and imports goods b  and ,c  respectively, 
from countries B and C. Country C produces good c  and imports goods a  and .b  For each 
country's production technology, we adopt the simple case that one of a unique resource input 
produces one unit of final good in its specialization. 
Given that countries A and B are each other's enemies, they transform fractions of their 
endowments into military weapons for national defense. We consider a simple military technology 
that one unit of an endowed resource produces one unit of guns. Denote ( 0)AG   and ( 0)BG   as 
the amounts of resources allocated to arming by A and B, respectively. A country's national security 
policy is a broader concept to include such dimensions as military, economics, environment, 
                                                 
16 This differs from the assumption of “small open economies” in the standard trade analysis, where trading nations 
accept as given the prices of tradable goods in their competitive world markets. The models of international trade 
developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1997, 1999) are examples of trade among large open economies. Chang and 
Sellak (2018) analyze the behavior of conflict over external territories between two large open countries in which 
their optimal arming decisions affect the equilibrium terms of trade. 
17 Polachek (1980) is among the first to contend that conflict is supposed to affect terms of trade between nations.   
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energy, technology, and so forth. For analytical simplicity, we use the conflict-related arming 
allocation of a contending country to represent its security policy. To measure the likelihood of a 
country in retaining its endowed resource after fighting, we use a canonical “contest success 
function” (CSF) to reflect the technology of conflict (see, e.g., Tullock 1980; Hirshleifer 1989; 
Skaperdas 1996). The CSFs for the two adversaries, A and B, are: 
1
 for 0;   for 0.
2
i
i A B i A B
A B
G
G G G G
G G
 = +   = = =
+
   (1) 
In the event of resource predation, country A loses AK  units of good a and country B loses 
BK units of good b.18 Taking into account arming allocations and the associated destruction costs, 
we calculate the quantities of goods a  and b  that countries A and B supply to the competitive 



















   (2) 
Note that in (2), we take into account the CSFs in (1). 
As for to preferences over the final goods in consumption, we assume for analytical 
simplicity and model tractability that market demand for good { , , }i a b c  in the country 
{ , , }j A B C  is taken to be linear:19 
,
j j
i iQ P = −           (3a) 
where
j
iP  is the price of good i  in country ,j  the parameter ( )R  is a measure of market size, 
and 0.   Corresponding to the demands in (3a), we have consumer surplus (CS) for country j  
as follows: 
                                                 
18 As in Hadjiyiannis et al (2016), we assume that 
AK and 
BK  are fixed costs of destruction to A and B. 
19 As in the competing importers framework of Bagwell and Staiger (1997, 1999), we assume away income effects 
in demand for each good as well as substitutability between traded goods. It should be mentioned that there is 
implicitly a freely traded numeraire good that leads to in the derivation of linear demands. The assumption of linear 
demands makes the present analysis tractable in terms of deriving optimal arming and tariffs for some symmetric 
cases. That is, the simple assumption makes it possible to analyze the endogeneity of both security and trade policies 
under resource appropriation possibilities. We make no attempt to present a general analysis due to its complexity, 
which would be an interesting extension for future research. 
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2 2 21 [( ) ( ) ( ) ].
2
jj j j
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −     (3b) 
The CS measure in (3b) reveals that the benefits of consumers in each country depend not only on 
products domestically produced, but also products from two other countries (either through 
imports or via appropriation for the enemy countries). From the perspective of consumer benefits, 
this reflects “economic interdependence” in consumption through trade and/or appropriation.  
As for the benefits of producers in each country, we look at producer surplus (PS). Consider 
first the adversaries A and B. Including the appropriated amounts of consumption goods, AR  for 
A and BR  for B, the PS measures for A and B are given, respectively, as  
[( ) ]
A
A A A A
a a b A B
G




 and [( ) ],
B
B B B B
b b a A B
G




  (4) 
where 
A
aZ  and 
B
bZ  are given in (2) as the quantities of goods a  and b  respectively produced by 
A and B. Country C, not an enemy to A and B, produces and supplies R  units of good c  to the 
market such that its producer surplus is:   
.C CcPS P R=             (5) 
As in the economics literature, the objective of country j is to maximize its domestic social 
welfare ( ),jSW which is taken to be the sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tariff 
revenues ( ).jTR
 
That is,  
j j j jSW CS PS TR= + +  for { , , },j A B C       (6) 
where jCS and jPS  are given in (3)-(5). The total tariff revenues jTR
 
depend on the trading 
relationships among the three countries, which are the focal points of our subsequent analyses. 
To analyze the endogeneity of security and trade policies, we consider a four-stage game. 
Stage one is a trade regime commitment stage at which (i) two countries that form an RTA agree 
members duty-free access to each other's market, or (ii) the three countries agree upon either free 
trade or trade protectionism. Stage two is an optimal security stage at which the two adversaries, 
A and B, independently and simultaneously determine their arming allocations.20 Stage three is a 
tariff stage at which each country determines its tariff structure on imports, depending on whether 
                                                 
20 This stage of determining optimal resources to be allocated to arming can be referred to as the arming stage. This 
excludes country C which is not an enemy to A and B.  
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any two of the three countries form an FTA, whether there is worldwide free trade (under which 
tariff rates are zero), or whether there is trade protectionism.21 At the fourth and last stage of the 
game, the three countries engage in trade. We use backward induction to derive a sub-game perfect 
equilibrium for each trade regime. We first focus on the protectionist regime. 
 
 2.2 Trade protectionism 
In the absence of economic integration through cooperative trading arrangements, we have 
a protectionist regime under which each country determines an optimal tariff structure for restraint 
imports. Denote 
j
i  as the specific tariff that country j  imposes on its import of good .i  We wish 
to derive the trade and conflict equilibrium under the protectionist regime with resource conflict 
between countries A and B. This case serves as the benchmark to evaluate equilibrium outcomes 
under alternative trade regimes. 
To maintain the patterns of trade and the specialization of production as described earlier, 
we note the comparative advantage principle that a good's price in an exporting country plus a 
specific tariff imposed on the good by an importing country can never be lower than the good's 
price in the importing country. This principle excludes the possibilities of arbitrage in the three-
country world (Bagwell and Staiger, 1997, 1999). For good a that country A produces and exports, 
we have the following no-arbitrage conditions: 
A B B
a a aP P+ =  and ,
A C C
a a aP P+ =        (7) 
where 
B
a  and 
C
a  are specific tariffs respectively imposed by countries B and C on good a.
22 We 
solve the equilibrium price of the consumption good in country A by equating the good's aggregate 
demand with its aggregate supply.  That is, trade equilibrium for good a requires that  
( ) ( ) ( ) 3 .A B C A Aa a aP P P G K     − + − + − = − −      (8) 
                                                 
21 This stage of determining optimal tariffs can be referred to as the trade stage. 
22 Given that Ba  and 
C
a  are all positive under the protectionist regime, the non-arbitrage conditions imply that  
A B
a aP P  and .
A C
a aP P  These imply that country A has the comparative advantage in producing and exporting good 
a to other countries.   
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In (8),23 we assume that the value of R  equals 3 as in Hadjiyiannis et al. (2016) for 
analytical tractability. Substituting 
B
aP  and 
C
aP  in terms of 
A
aP  from (7) into the equilibrium 
condition in (8), we solve for the market price of good a in country A: 
3 ( ) (3 )
.
3





   

− + − − −
=       (9a) 
Using A
aP  in (9a) and the conditions in (7), we calculate the market prices of good a in B and C: 
3 2 (3 )
,
3







+ − − − −
=  
3 2 (3 )
.
3







− + − − −
=          (9b) 
Similarly, for good b that country B produces and exports, the no-arbitrage conditions 
are: 
B A A
b b bP P+ =   and  ,
B C C
b b bP P+ =        (10) 
where 
A
b  and 
C
b  are specific tariffs imposed by countries A and C on good b. Trade 
equilibrium for good b requires that 
( ) ( ) ( ) 3 .A B C B Bb b bP P P G K     − + − + − = − −     (11) 
Substituting 
A
bP  and 
C
bP  in terms of 
B
bP  from (10) into the market equilibrium condition in 
(11),24 we solve for the price of good b  in country B: 
3 ( ) (3 )
.
3





   

− + − − −
=       (12a) 
Using 
B
bP  in (12a) and the non-arbitrary conditions in (10), we have the market prices of good b 
in A and C: 
3 2 (3 )
3







+ − − − −
=  and 
3 2 (3 )
.
3







− + − − −
=    (12b) 
As for good ,c  trade equilibrium requires that  
( ) ( ) ( ) 3,A B Cc c cP P P     − + − + − =        (13) 
                                                 
23 An alternative approach leading to the same trade equilibrium condition as in (8) can be found in Appendix B-1.  




cP  and 
B
cP satisfy the non-arbitrary conditions:  
C A A
c c cP P+ =  and .
C B B
c c cP P+ =         (14) 



























   

− + −
=          (15) 
The above analysis constitutes the fourth and last stage of the four-stage game at which the three 
countries engage in trade.  
 
We proceed to the third stage at which the three countries independently and 
simultaneously determine their optimal tariffs. For country A, the total amount of revenues from 
imposing tariffs, { , },
A A
b c  on goods b and c is:  
,A A A A Ab b c cTR M M = +         (16a) 
where 
A
bM   and 
A
cM  are the quantities of the goods imported. That is,
25   
[( )3 ] ( ) ( ),
B
A B B B C
b b bA B
G
M G K P P
G G
   = − − − − − −
+
 (16b)    
3 ( ) ( ).A B Cc c cM P P   = − − − −        (16c) 
Substituting market prices of the three goods from (9), (12), and (15) into 
ACS  in (3), 
APS  
in (4), and ATR  in (16a), we calculate country A's social welfare ( )
A A A ASW CS PS TR= + +  in 
terms of tariff rates, { , , , , , },
A A B B C C
b c a c a b       and arming allocations, { , }.
A BG G  All else being 
unchanged, country A determines its tariff structure, { , },
A A
b c   to maximize domestic welfare, 
.ASW  Using the first-order conditions (FOCs) that 0A AbSW   =  and 0,
A A
cSW   =  we 
calculate the optimal tariffs which are: 
                                                 
25
 For equilibrium in trade, 
A
b
M  in (16b) is the amount of good b exported by country B and AcM  in (16c) 
is that of good c exported by country C to country A.  
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(3 ) 6
8 8 ( )
C B A B B A
A b
b A B


















= +    (17) 
 
For country B, its total revenue from imposing tariffs, { , },
B B
a c  on goods a and c is: 
,B B B B Ba a c cTR M M = +         (18a) 
where 
B
aM   and 
B
cM  are given, respectively, as
26  
[( )3 ] ( ) ( ),
A
B A A A C
a a aA B
G
M G K P P
G G
   = − − − − − −
+
    (18b) 
3 ( ) ( ).B A Cc c cM P P   = − − − −        (18c) 
Substituting market prices of the three goods from from (9),  (12), and (15) into BCS  in (3), BPS  
in (4), and BTR  in (18a), we calculate country B's social welfare ( )
B B B BSW CS PS TR= + +  in 
terms of tariff rates, { , , , , , },
A A B B C C
b c a c a b       and arming allocations,{ , }.
A BG G  All else being 
unchanged, country B determines an optimal tariff structure, { , },
B B
a c   to maximize its social 
welfare: .BSW  The FOCs are: 0
B B
aSW   =  and 0.
B B
cSW   =  We calculate the optimal 
tariffs which are:  
(3 ) 6
8 8 ( )
C A A B A B
B a
a A B


















= +    (19) 
For country C, its total revenue from imposing tariffs, { , },
C C
a b  on goods a and b is: 
,C C C C Ca a b bTR M M = +         (20a) 
where 
C
aM   and 
C
bM  are given, respectively, as
27  
( )C Ca aM P = −  and ( ).
C C
b bM P = −       (20b) 
                                                 
26
 Trade equilibrium indicates that BaM  in (18b) is the amount of good a exported by country A and 
B
cM   
in (18c) is that of good c exported by country C to country B. 
27
 In (20b), trade equilibrium indicates that CaM  is the amount of good a exported by country A and 
C
b
M    
in is that of good b exported by country B to country C.  
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Substituting market prices of the three goods from (9), (12), and (15) into CCS  in (3), CPS  in (5), 
and CTR  in (20a), we calculate social welfare for country C, ( ),
C C C CSW CS PS TR= + +  in terms 
of tariff rates, { , , , , , },
A A B B C C
b c a c a b       and arming allocations, { , }.
A BG G  All else being 
unchanged, country C sets an optimal tariff structure, { , },
C C
a b   to maximize its social welfare:
.CSW  The FOCs are: 0
C C
aSW   =  and 0.
C C





















= +      (21) 
Making use of (17), (19), and (21), we calculate the optimal tariffs set by the three countries under 
the protectionist regime (PR): 
, (3 ) 5 ,
77 ( )
A B B A B
A PR
b A B







, (3 ) 5 ,
77 ( )
A B A B A
B PR
a A B







   
, 2 (3 ) ,
77 ( )
B A B A A
C PR
a A B







, 2 (3 ) ,
77 ( )
A A B B B
C PR
b A B




















=         (22a) 









































































, , ,A PR C PRc a   
, , .B PR C PRc b          (22b) 
We summarize the economic implications of the results as follows:  
Lemma 1. Under the protectionist regime in a three-country world with two adversaries and a 
neutral third party, we have the following: 
(i) Optimal tariffs set by the adversaries on their imports from the neutral third country are 
independent of their arming allocations. For all other scenarios (such as trade between the two 
adversaries and the neutral third country's imports), optimal tariffs are negatively related to the 
conflict-related arming allocations by the adversaries. 
(ii) Each of the adversaries sets a higher tariff on import from the third country than the tariff set 
by the third country on its imports. 
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Given that country C is not an enemy of A and B, the arming allocations of the two 
adversaries do not affect their optimal tariffs on imports from the neutral country. Owing to the 
conflict between A and B, increasing arming by either one lowers its endowed resource available 
for production, which is welfare-reducing. In response to this, A and B find it optimal to reduce 
tariffs on each other's imports. Raising tariffs on imports while allocating more resources to arming 
would aggravate the welfare-reducing effect of arming on production. This explains why the 
optimal tariffs set by A and B are negatively related to their arming allocations. Although the tariffs 
set by A or B on their imports from C are independent of their arming allocations, either A or B 
sets a higher tariff than the tariff set by country C. The reason is to mitigate the production-
distortion effect of arming which affects welfare negatively.  
Next, we proceed to the security stage at which the contending countries, A and B, 
independently and simultaneously determine their optimal arming allocations. Under symmetry, 
we have 
, ,A PR B PR PRG G G= = . This exercise yields    
238416 4312 22319 (17424 51744 28248) 49 1 35
.
264 66 2 24
PR K KG K
  

+ − + + −
= − − +     (23) 
It is easy to verify that 
PRG  in (23) is positive for 3.R  =   
It is instructive to examine in detail how arming by a contending country affects its 
domestic social welfare. Using country, A as an example (under the assumption of symmetry), we 
show in Appendix B-4 the following welfare decomposition: 
Export-revenue effect Resource-appropriation effect
               (+)                      (+)
( )
( )
             )
A AA
A A Aa b
a a bA A A
A A A
A A Ab b b










   = − − +




Output-distortion effect  Tariff-revenue plus import-spending effect










   
  (24) 
where [ ( )]
A A A B
bAPP G G G R= +  for 3R =  is the amount of good b appropriated by country A.  
We summarize the economic implications of the welfare decomposition as follows:  
Lemma 2. Under the protectionist regime in a three-country world with two adversaries and a 
neutral third party, the impact that an adversary country's arming has on its welfare contains four 
different effects. (i) The first is an export-revenue effect, which increases welfare as increasing 
38 
arming causes export price and revenue to go up. (ii) The second is a resource-appropriation 
effect, which increases welfare as increasing arming increases the appropriation of final good for 
domestic consumption. (iii) The third is a tariff-revenue plus import-spending effect, which lowers 
welfare as increasing arming raises import price, lowers import demand, and reduces tariff 
revenue net of import spending. (iv) The fourth is an output-distortion effect, which reduces 
welfare as increasing arming cause domestic production to go down.  
Note that the first two effects (i and ii) constitute the marginal revenue (MR) of arming, 
and the last two effects (iii and iv) measure the marginal cost (MC) of arming. The above analysis 
promotes us to investigate how the optimal arming, ,PRG  under the protectionist regime is affected 
by different types of trade relationships (e.g., an FTA between two adversaries between one of the 
adversaries and a neutral third party). We shall see that the endogenous security analysis permits 
us to compare conflict intensities associated with differential trade regimes. We proceed to 
investigate the scenario where there is an FTA between two adversaries.  
  
 3. An FTA between Two Contending Countries (A and B) 
It is instructive to examine equilibrium arming when countries A and B form an FTA and 
access each other's market duty-free, despite their disputes over valuable resources. This analysis 
allows one to see how FTA formation between adversaries affects their arming decisions under 
resource appropriations. One issue of interest is: Would each contending country allocate more or 
less resource to arming under the FTA regime (for “dancing with the enemy” in trade regionalism) 
than under the protectionist regime?   
As in the analysis under the protectionist regime, we use a four-stage game structure to 
characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium for the FTA between A and B, denoted the 
FTA(A&B) regime. At stage one, A and B commit to the FTA(A&B) regime. At stage two, the two 
countries independently and simultaneously determine their optimal arming allocations that 
maximize their domestic welfare. At stage three, A and B set zero tariffs ( 0)
A B
b a = =  on each 




c  on imports from country C. 
At stage three, country C sets an optimal tariff structure, { , },
C C
a b  on imports from A and B. At 




b a = =  under the FTA(A&B) regime, we substitute zero tariff rates into 
the price equations in (9), (12), and (15) to obtain the market prices of goods a, b, and c:  
, ( & ) , ( & ) 3 (3 ) ,
3
C A A






− − − −
= =  










− − − −
= =  
, ( & ) 3 2 (3 ) ,
3
C A A






+ − − −
=  










+ − − −
=  
, ( & ) 3 2 3 ,
3
A B
















, ( & ) 3 ( ) 3.
3
A B
C FTA A B c c
cP
   

− + −
=        (25) 
Note that the tariff rates, { , },
C C
a b  in the price equations remain to be determined by the 
countries at the third stage of the four-stage game. For calculating an optimal tariff that country A 
imposes on good c, denoted as 
, ( & ) ,A FTA A Bc we note the import demand equation: 
, ( & ) , ( & ) ,A FTA A B A FTA A Bc cM P = −  where 
, ( & )A FTA A B
cP  is given in (25). After substitution, we have  
, ( & ) , ( & )
, ( & ) , ( & ) 2 3.
3
B FTA A B A FTA A B





= − =  
Given the prices of the three goods in (25), country A's consumer and producer surplus are: 
, ( & ), ( & ) , ( & ) 2 2 , ( & ) 21 [( ) ( ) ( ) ],
2
A FTA A BA FTA A B A FTA A B A FTA A B
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −  
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & )[( )3 ] [( )3],
A A
A FTA A B A FTA A B A A A FTA A B
a bA B A B
G G
PS P G K P
G G G G
= − − +
+ +
  
The social welfare function of country A is: 
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & )A FTA A B A FTA A B A FTA A B A FTA A B A FTA A B
c cSW CS PS M= + +  
and its FOC is:   
, ( & ) , ( & ), ( & )




B FTA A B A FTA A BA FTA A B
c c





= − + =

 
Solving for the optimal tariff set by country A, we have     
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, ( & )
, ( & ) 3 .
8 8
B FTA A B





= +        (26a) 
To calculate country B's optimal tariff on good c, we note that the import demand equation 
is: , ( & ) , ( & ) ,B FTA A B B FTA A Bc cM P = −  where 
, ( & )B FTA A B
cP   is given in (25). After substitution, we have  
, ( & ) , ( & )
, ( & ) 2 3 0.
3
A FTA A B B FTA A B
B FTA A B c c
cM
 − +
= =  
Given the prices of the three goods in (25), country B's consumer and producer surplus are: 
 
, ( & ), ( & ) , ( & ) 2 2 , ( & ) 21 [( ) ( ) ( ) ],
2
B FTA A BB FTA A B B FTA A B B FTA A B
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −       
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & )[( )3 ] [( )3].
B B
B FTA A B B FTA A B B B B FTA A B
b aA B A B
G G
PS P G K P
G G G G
= − − +
+ +
 
The social welfare function of country B is: 
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & )B FTA A B B FTA A B B FTA A B B FTA A B B FTA A B
c cSW CS PS M= + +   
and its FOC is:   
, ( & ) , ( & ), ( & )




A FTA A B B FTA A BB FTA A B
c c





= − + =

 
Solving for the optimal tariff for country B, we have  
, ( & )
, ( & ) 3 .
8 8
A FTA A B





= +    `    (26b) 
As for country C, it determines an optimal tariff structure on imports from A and B to maximize 
its social welfare:  
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) ,C FTA A B C FTA A B C FTA A B C FTA A BSW CS PS TR= + +   
where 
, ( & ), ( & ) , ( & ) 2 2 , ( & ) 21 [( ) ( ) ( ) ],
2
C FTA A BC FTA A B C FTA A B C FTA A B
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −  
, ( & ) , ( & )3 ,C FTA A B C FTA A BcPS P=
 
, ( & ), ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & )[ ] [ ].
C FTA A BC FTA A B C FTA A B C FTA A B C
a a b bTR P P     = − + −   
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The FOCs for country C are: 
, ( & ), ( & )




A A C FTA A BC FTA A B
a








, ( & ), ( & )




C FTA A BB BC FTA A B
b








which imply that the optimal tariffs on goods a and b are: 
, ( & ) 3
8
A A

















=     (26c) 
Making use of (26a)-(26c), we solve for the optimal tariffs: 
, ( & ) , ( & ) 3 ,
7
A FTA A B B FTA A B
c c 

= =   
, ( & ) 3 ,
8
A A







, ( & ) 3 .
8
B B






=     (27a) 
From (27a), it follows that  










= = − 
 
 
, ( & ) , ( & )A FTA A B C FTA A B
c a   and 
, ( & ) , ( & ).B FTA A B C FTA A Bc b       (27b) 
Under the FTA(A&B) regime, optimal tariffs set by countries A and B on imports from country C 
are independent of their conflict-related arming decisions. However, tariffs set by country C on its 
imports from A and B are decreasing functions of the arming allocations. Moreover, either A or B 
sets a higher tariff on its import of good c than the tariff rate set by country C. These qualitative 
results in (27) are similar to those as shown in Corollaries 1 and 2 for the protectionist regime.  
We proceed to the second stage at which the contending countries A and B independently 
and simultaneously determine their optimal arming decisions. Substituting the optimal tariffs in 
(26) back into the welfare functions of A and B, we have , ( & )A FTA A BSW  and , ( & )B FTA A BSW  as 
functions of AG  and .BG  The FOCs for A and B are: 
, ( & )
0







  and 
, ( & )
0.









Denote the Nash equilibrium levels of arming as , ( & ) , ( & ){ , }.A FTA A B B FTA A BG G  The 
assumption of symmetry implies that 
, ( & ) , ( & ) ( & ).A FTA A B B FTA A B FTA A BG G G= =  Solving for the 
optimal arming, we have   
2
( & ) 4096 3159 (1521 4992 3510) 32 3 .
78 39 2 2
FTA A B K K KG
  − + + −
= − − +   (28) 
Evaluating the slope , ( & )A FTA A B ASW G   at the point where ,A PRG G= 28 we find that    
, ( & )
, 3, 0.2
0.A PR
A FTA A B
A G G K
SW




        
The strict concavity of the social welfare function implies that   
( & ) .FTA A B PRG G 29           (29a) 
Equation (29a) indicates that both adversary countries allocate fewer resources to arming under 
the FTA(A&B) regime than under the protectionist regime. As in the conflict literature, we define 
conflict intensity (CI) under a trade regime as .A BCI G G +  It follows from (29a) that under 
symmetry we have 
( & ) .FTA A B PRCI CI          (29b) 
Given the results in (29a) and (29b), we compare optimal tariffs under the protectionist regime to 
those under the FTA(A&B) regime as shown in (22a) and (27a). It follows that   
, ( & ) ,C FTA A B C PR
a a   and 
, ( & ) , 
.
C FTA A B C PR
b b
   
We present economic implications as follows. Moving from the protectionist regime to the 
FTA(A&B) regime, countries A and B become intra-bloc members whereas country C is an 
outsider. In response, country C finds it optimal to set lower tariffs in the face of the FTA(A&B) 
regime than those under the protectionist regime. This result is consistent with the “tariff 
complementarity effect” associated with an FTA as shown in the international trade literature 
(Bagwell and Staiger, 1999). The FTA(A&B) regime thus helps generate improvements of terms-
of-trade benefits for countries A and B vis-à-vis country C. Moreover, the member countries A and 
                                                 
28  Note that we assign some plausible values for (i.e., 0.2)K K = in evaluating the derivative.  
29 The inequality relationship in (28) can also be reached by a direct comparison between ( & )FTA A BG  in (28) and 
PRG  
in (23) under symmetry and the same values of exogenous variables. 
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B benefit from duty-free access to each other's market, which encourages them to increase 
productions of their products for exports within the trade bloc. It provides a positive incentive for 
each country to allocate fewer resources to arming. Consequently, there is a conflict-reducing 
effect associated with the formation of an FTA between the adversaries.   
The results as shown in (29) imply that, under the FTA(A&B) regime, the positive resource-
appropriation effect of arming on welfare is not strong enough to outweigh the economic benefits 
from the two factors. One is the elimination of trade barriers between A and B. The other is the 
tariff complementarity effect which improves the trading positions of both A and B relative to C. 
We, therefore, have 
PROPOSITION 1. In a three-country world with two adversaries and a neutral third party, 
forming an FTA between the adversary countries (A and B) allows access to each other's market 
duty-free. Consequently, the FTA(A&B) regime reduces conflict intensity and has a stronger 
pacifying effect than the protectionist regime. 
Proposition 1 indicates that the commitment of forming an FTA between adversaries has 
an important policy implication for interstate conflicts. The formation of an FTA makes it possible 
for two adversary countries to become members of a trade institution. The adversaries become 
likely to engage in military aggression since the FTA causes the overall conflict intensity to 
decline. In other words, FTA constitutes a conflict-reducing trade institution for two enemy 
countries. Our endogenous security analysis thus provides a theoretical justification for the 
empirical finding of Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000). The authors document that joint 
memberships in preferential trade agreements significantly reduce hostility between intra-bloc 
members. 
One interesting and important issue that appears not to have been examined in the conflict 
and trade literature concerns wither forming an FTA between adversaries makes the three-country 
world "safer" (in terms of conflict intensity) than the case when there is worldwide free trade 
without the FTA. To compare conflict intensity between these alternative trade regimes, we 
proceed to examine conflict equilibrium in the case of free trade worldwide.       
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 4. Worldwide Free Trade 
The next case of interest is when there is worldwide free trade (denoted the WFT regime) 
in that the tariff rates set by countries A, B, and C at the third stage of the game are all zero. That 
is, 
, 0j WFTi =  for { ,  , }i a b c and { ,  ,  }.j A B C  It follows from (9), (12), and (15) that the 
market prices of goods a, b, and c under the WFT regime are: 
, , , 3 (3 ) ,
3
A A







= = =   
, , , 3 (3 ) ,
3
B B







= = =  , , ,
1




= = =  
At the second stage, both countries A and B determine their optimal arming allocations. 
For country A, its social welfare function is: 
, , , ,A WFT A WFT A WFTSW CS PS= +  where 
, , 2 , 2 , 21 [( ) ( ) ( ) ],
2
A WFT A WFT A WFT A WFT
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −  
, , ,[( )3 )] [( )3].
A A
A WFT A WFT A A A WFT
a bA B A B
G G
PS P G K P
G G G G
= − − +
+ +
 
For country B, its social welfare function is: 
, , , ,B WFT B WFT B WFTSW CS PS= + where 
, , 2 , 2 , 21 [( ) ( ) ( ) ],
2
B WFT B WFT B WFT B WFT
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −  
, , ,[( )3 )] [( )3].
B B
B WFT B WFT B B B WFT
a bA B A B
G G
PS P G K P
G G G G
= − − +
+ +
 
The FOCs for A and B are: , 0A WFT ASW G  =   and , 0,B WFT BSW G  =  which lead to the Nash 
equilibrium levels of arming, denoted as 
, ,{ , }.A WFT B WFTG G   Under symmetry in all dimensions, 
we have 
, , .A WFT B WFT WFTG G G= =  This exercise allows us to calculate the optimal arming as 
follows:  
281 45 (25 90 60) 9 3
.
78 10 2 2
WFT K K KG
  − + + −
= − − +     (30) 
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Evaluating the slopes ,A WFT ASW G  and ,B WFT BSW G  at the point where 
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The strict concavity of social welfare function for each country implies that   
( & ) .FTA A B WFTG G          (31) 
We further evaluate the slopes ,A WFT ASW G   and ,B WFT BSW G  at the point where 





A G G K
SW









B G G K
SW





The strict concavity of the social welfare function for each country implies that 
.WFT PRG G           (32) 
Following the results in (31) and (32), we thus have31 
( & )FTA A B WFT PRG G G   or 
( & )
.
FTA A B WFT PRCI CI CI     (33) 
Moving from the PR regime to the WFT regime, all the countries can enjoy economic 
benefits from accessing each other's markets duty-free. The contending countries are better off by 
lowering their arming to produce more of final goods for consumption and exports. There is a 
resource appropriation effect of arming which is welfare-improving. However, the resource 
appropriation effect of arming is more than offset by the gains from free trade, causing arming to 
decline under the WFT regime. 
In comparing arming allocations for a regime move from FTA(A&B) to WFT, we use a 
welfare decomposition approach to explain why the optimal arming increases. We show in 
Appendix B-5 that  
( & )
( & ) ( & ) ( & )2
( & )
[31( ) 93 31 36 108]
0.
576FTA A BA BG G G
FTA A B FTA A B FTA A BWFT
A FTA A B
G G G K KSW
G G= =




                                                 
30 Note that we assign some plausible values for (i.e., 0.2)K K = in evaluating the derivative.  
31 The inequality relationship in (31c) can also be reached by a direct comparison among 
( , )FTA A BG  in (28), 
PRG  in 
(23), 
WFTG in (30) under symmetry and the plausible values of exogenous variables. 
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The slope of each adversary's welfare function with respect to its arming under the WFT regime, 
when evaluated at 
( & )
,
FTA A BA BG G G= = is strictly positive. Figure 1 is a graphical illustration of 
this result. As shown in the welfare decomposition analysis in A-5, the strict positivity of this 
derivative is because the export-revenue effect plus the resource-appropriation effect, which define 
the marginal revenue of arming, exceed the output-distortion effect, which defines the marginal 
cost of arming. Moving from the FTA(A&B) regime to the WFT regime, we find that the marginal 
revenue of arming is higher than its marginal cost. In response to this, countries A and B increase 
their arming allocations. We thus have the following proposition: 
  
Figure 2.1 Optimal arming is lower under FTA(A&B) than under worldwide free trade 
 
PROPOSITION 2: In a three-country world with two contending countries and a neutral third 
state, each contending country's optimal arming is lower under the FTA(A&B) regime than under 
the WFT regime. A move in trade regime from FTA(A&B) to WFT will cause arming to increase 
since the marginal revenue of arming (resulting from the export-revenue effect and the 
appropriation effect) exceeds the marginal cost of arming (resulting from the output-distortion 
effect). Thus, forming an FTA between the adversaries lowers conflict intensity and has a stronger 
pacifying effect than the WFT regime.   
The results in Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that “dancing with the enemy” through the 
formation of an FTA is conflict-reducing. From the perspective of conflict over resources, our 
kSW  
( ( & ), )kG k FTA A B WFT=  0  WFTG  
WFTSW  












( & )FTA A BG  
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analysis shows that forming a trade institution such as FTA between two adversaries reduces 
interstate military tensions as compared to worldwide free trade. Under such a circumstance, an 
FTA between adversaries is, in essence, not a double-edged sword.  To the best of our knowledge, 
this theoretical finding has not yet been shown in the existing literature on interstate conflict and 
trade regionalism. 
 
 5. An FTA between Countries A and C  
We proceed to examine the case where one of the contending countries (say, A) forms an 
FTA with the neutral third country C in order to enjoy free-duty access to each other's market. 
Under such a free trade arrangement, denoted as the FTA(A&C) regime, we have: 
, ( & ) , ( & ) 0.A FTA A C C FTA A Cc a = =  
At the trade policy stage, countries A and C independently and simultaneously determine 
optimal tariffs, 
A
b  and ,
C
b on their imports of good b.  In the meanwhile, country B sets an optimal 
tariff structure, { , },
B B
a c   on its imports of goods a and c. 
Given that 
, ( & ) , ( & ) 0,A FTA A C C FTA A Cc a = =  we have from equations (9), (12), and (15) 
that the prices of three goods under the FTA(A&C) regime are: 
, ( & ) , ( & ) 3 3 ,
3
B
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At the third stage of determining optimal tariffs, country A sets a specific tariff on the 
import of good b to maximize its social welfare: 
, ( & ), ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) ,
A FTA A CA FTA A C A FTA A C A FTA A C A
b bSW CS PS M= + +  
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where
, ( & ), ( & ) , ( & ) 2 2 , ( & ) 21 [( ) ( ) ( ) ],
2
A FTA A CA FTA A C A FTA A C A FTA A C
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −  
, ( & ), ( & ) , ( & )[( )3 ] [( )3],
A FTA A CA FTA A C A FTA A C A A
a A A b
A B A B
G G
PS P G K P
G G G G
== − − +
+ +
, ( & ) , ( & )
[ ] ( )3.
A
A FTA A C A FTA A C




 = − −
+
 
The FOC for country A implies that the optimal tariff on good b is: 
, ( & ) (3 ) 6 ( )( )
8 ( )
B A B A C B A B
A FTA A C b
b A B





− − − + − +
=
+
.   (34) 
As for country B, it determines an optimal tariff structure to maximize its domestic welfare: 
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & )B FTA A C B FTA A C B FTA A C B B FTA A C B B FTA A C
a a c cSW CS PS M M = + + + .   
The FOCs for country B implies that the optimal tariffs are:  
  
(3 ) 6 ( )
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A A B B A A B
B
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=    (35) 
Country C decides on an optimal tariff, which maximizes its social welfare:  
, ( & ), ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) ,
C FTA A CC FTA A C C FTA A C C FTA A C C
b bSW CS PS M= + +   
where 
C
bM  is given in (20c). The FOC for country C implies that its optimal tariff on good b is:   
, ( & ) (3 ) .
8
B B A






=        (36) 
Making use of (34)-(36), we solve for the equilibrium tariffs as follows: 
, ( & ) (3 ) 5 ,
77 ( )
B A B A B
A FTA A C
b A B







, ( & ) (3 ) 6 ,
88 ( )
A A B B A
B FTA A C
a A B








, ( & ) (3 ) 2 ,
77 ( )
B A B A B
C FTA A C
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, ( & ) 3 .
8
B FTA A C
c

=   (37) 
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We proceed to the second stage of the game at which countries A and B determine their 
security policies. Country A determines an optimal arming, denoted as 
, ( & ) ,A FTA A CG  that 
maximizes 
, ( & ), ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) .
A FTA A CA FTA A C A FTA A C A FTA A C A
b bSW CS PS M= + +  
Evaluating the slope 
, ( & )A FTA A C ASW G   at the point where ,A A PRG G=  we have32 
,
, ( & )
0.A A PR








The strict concavity of the social welfare function implies that   
, ( & ) , .A FTA A C A PRG G         (38a) 
Similarly, we have 
,
, ( & )
0,B B PR








which implies that  
, ( & ) ,B FTA A C B PRG G .        (38b) 
The result in (36b) indicates that B allocates more resource to arming when A forms an FTA with 
country C, relative to the case when there is a protectionist regime. It follows from (38a) and (38b) 
that 
( & ) .FTA A C PRCI CI          (38c) 
In the FTA(A&C) regime, there is an improvement of terms-of-trade benefit for country A 
(an insider) vis-à-vis country B (an outsider). Moreover, country A can enjoy duty-free access to 
country C's market. When A increases its arming, the resulting welfare-reducing effect of arming 
on domestic production is more than offset by its gains from trade, the latter of which come from 
the terms-of-trade improvement and the integration benefit with country C. Besides, there is a 
welfare-increasing effect of arming for country A due to gains from appropriation. As for country 
B, the adversary excluded from the FTA to be an outsider, we see a terms-of-trade deterioration 
for B vis-à-vis A and C. Nonetheless, the output-appropriation effect of arming encourages country 
B to increase arming since it is welfare-increasing. These results may explain why we have the 
inequalities in (38a) and (38b). We, therefore, can state the following proposition:  
                                                 
32 Note that we assign some plausible values for (i.e., 0.2)K K = in evaluating the derivative.  
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PROPOSITION 3. Relative to the conflict equilibrium under the protectionist regime, the optimal 
conflict-related arming allocation by each of the adversary countries is strictly higher when one 
of the contending countries and the neutral third party form an FTA. 
Taken together all the equilibrium outcomes (see equations 30, 33c, and 38) as shown 
above, we have a systematic ranking of conflict-related arming allocations or conflict intensities 
associated with the alternative trade regimes. That is,  
( & ) ( & )FTA A B WFT PR FTA A CG G G G    or ( & ) ( & ).FTA A B WFT PR FTA A CCI CI CI CI        (39) 
The results in (39) permit us to establish the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 4. In the world of three countries we consider, we have the following results: 
(i) The formation of an FTA between two adversaries has the most substantial pacifying effect in 
that the aggregate conflict intensity is the lowest among the four trade regimes; 
(ii) The second lowest conflict intensity is when there is worldwide free trade; 
(iii) The pacifying effect of the worldwide free trade regime is stronger than that of the protectionist 
regime; 
(iv) Relative to the protectionist regime, an FTA between one of the adversaries and a neutral third 
country is conflict-aggravating for the member and non-member states that are each other's 
enemies. 
Based on the results of Proposition 4, we find it straightforward to discuss the scenario 
where two adversaries fail to establish an FTA. Under this circumstance, a global free-trade regime 
turns out to be an option for making the world relatively "safer." The reason is that the resulting 
conflict intensity is relatively lower than that under the protectionist regime or in an FTA which 
includes one of two adversary countries but excludes the other adversary. 
 
 6. The Ranking of Conflict Intensities When RTA Takes the Form of CU 
We have analyzed and compared equilibrium outcomes for conflict intensities under four 
different types of trade regimes when regional trade agreement is an FTA. The next issue of interest 
concerns how the ranking of conflict intensities is affected when there is a CU. For the formation 
of CU between the adversary countries A and B, referred to as the CU(A&B) regime, we show in 
Appendix B-6 that  
 
51 
, ( & ) , ( & )A CU A B A FTA A BG G=  and , ( & ) , ( & ).B CU A B B FTA A BG G=    (40) 
Combining the results in (33) that ( & )FTA A B WFT PRG G G  , we have from (40) that  
, ( & ) , ,A CU A B A WFT A PRG G G         (41a) 
 and  
, ( & ) , , .B CU A B B WFT B PRG G G         (41b) 
Thus, under either FTA(A&B) or CU(A&B), countries A and B allocate less of their endowed 
resources to arming, compared to their arming allocations under the protectionist regime. Note that 
the main difference between CU(A&B) and FTA(A&B) lies in their different decisions in setting 
external tariffs to the non-member country, C. Under the CU(A&B) regime, a common external 
tariff on imports from the third country is relatively lower than the external tariffs under the 
FTA(A&B) regime. Given that the arming allocations of countries A and B do not affect their tariff 
policies on imports from the neutral third country,33 we have under symmetry that 
( & ) ( & ).CU A B FTA A BG G=  
We show in Appendix B-7 that the striking differences in optimal arming decisions 
between the adversary countries occur in the scenario where there is a CU between one of the 
adversaries (say, A) and a neutral third country (C). We denote this as the CU(A&C) regime. For 
country A, we find that  
,
, ( & )
0,A A PR








which implies that  
, ( & ) , .A CU A C A PRG G         (42) 
That is, country A allocates more resource to arming under the CU(A&C) regime than under the 
protectionist regime. Combining the results in (40)-(42), we have  
, ( & ) , , , ( & ).A CU A B A WFT A PR A CU A CG G G G        (43) 
For country B, however, we find that  
,
, ( & )
0,B B PR








                                                 
33 See equation (26.a) for the case of the FTA(A&B) regime and equation (a.6) for that of the CU(A&B) regime. 
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which implies that 
, ( & ) , .B CU A C B PRG G         (44) 
That is, country B's optimal arming is lower under the CU(A&C) regime than under the 
protectionist regime. It follows from (41b) and (44) that 
, ( & ) , ,B CU A B B WFT B PRG G G   and , ( & ) , .B CU A C B PRG G     (45) 
Given the findings in (43) and (45), we cannot predict unambiguously whether conflict intensity 
under the CU(A&C) regime, 
( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) ,CU A C A CU A C B CU A CCI G G= +  is higher, equal to, or 
lower than that under the protectionist regime, , , .PR A PR B PRCI G G= +   That is, 
( & ) ( )( ) .CU A C PRCI CI =   
We thus have 
PROPOSITION 5. In the three-country world of conflict and trade,   
(i) The CU(A&B) regime and the FTA(A&B) regime between two adversaries are equally effective 
in that they have the stronger pacifying effect than worldwide free trade or the protectionist 
regime; 
(ii) Compared to the FTA(A&B) regime, country A's optimal arming allocations under the 
alternative regimes are: 
, ( & ) , ( & ) , , , ( & ).A FTA A B A CU A B A WFT A PR A CU A CG G G G G=     As an 
outsider of the RTA, country B's optimal arming allocations under the alternative regimes are: 
, ( & ) , ,B CU A B B WFT B PRG G G   and 
, ( & ) , .B CU A C B PRG G   
(ii) Relative to the protectionist regime, the CU(A&C) regime may not be conflict-aggravating for 
the member and non-member countries, A and B, that are each other's enemies. 
The results in Propositions 4 and 5 reveal that there are similarities and differences between 
CU and FTA in affecting the equilibrium intensities of conflict (relative to the protectionist regime 
with no regionalism). The conflict-reducing effect associated with the FTA(A&B) regime 
continues to emerge under the CU(A&B) regime. Nevertheless, under the CU(A&C) regime, the 
common external tariff that countries A and C impose on good b is unambiguously lower than the 
optimal tariffs that country B imposes goods a and c. The tariff complementarity effect allows 
country B to enjoy economic benefits from producing and exporting more of its consumption good 
to the markets in A and C. As such, the tariff complementarity effect may provide a positive 
incentive for country B to lower its arming under the CU(A&C) regime. This result suggests that 
53 
the conflict-aggravating effect associated with the FTA(A&C) regime may not show up for the 
CU(A&C) regime. 
 
 7. Concluding Remarks 
Voluminous studies in the literature on regional trading agreements have contributed to our 
understanding about differences between FTAs and CUs from the perspective of international 
economics. Moreover, there are tremendous efforts to resolving the longstanding debates about 
the links between trade and conflict. This paper is the first to allow for the endogeneity of both 
security and trade policies in analyzing the relationship between interstate conflict and trade 
institutions. With resource appropriation possibilities, it is imperative for each state to determine 
a "grand" strategy that encompasses both trade policy option and an optimal arming decision. This 
paper is a new attempt in this direction to develop an economic model of trade regionalism and 
armed conflict. Our analyses are based on the observations that regional trading agreements 
involve elements of economic interdependence, political power, strategic military buildups 
between adversaries, and resource appropriations.  
Our endogenous security analysis compares the equilibrium levels of conflict intensity 
associated with different trade regimes. The comparison of the differing conflict intensities is not 
forthcoming when arming is exogenously-given. The contributions of our study lie in stressing the 
endogeneity of both security and trade policies in affecting conflict equilibrium when two 
adversaries may opt to form an FTA or when one of them and a neutral third party form an FTA. 
This approach permits us to see how the equilibrium intensity of regional conflict is directly related 
to trade regimes. For different trade regimes, the ranking of conflict intensities from low to high 
is: (i) an FTA between two adversaries, (ii) worldwide free trade, (iii) trade protectionism without 
regional trade agreements of any form, and (iv) an FTA between one of the adversaries and a 
neutral third country. The policy implications of the trade-conflict analysis are profound. First, 
forming an FTA between two adversaries has the strongest pacifying effect, followed by 
worldwide free trade. Second, the pacifying effect of the worldwide free trade regime is stronger 
than that of the protectionist regime without regionalism. Third, compared to the protectionist 
regime, an FTA between one of the adversaries and a neutral third country is conflict-aggravating 
for the member and non-member states that are each other's enemies. However, we may or may 
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not observe such a conflict-aggravating effect associated with an FTA when the preferential 
trading agreement takes the form of a CU.  
Given the growing tensions in the international arena resulting from interstate disputes and 
resource appropriation, our theoretical findings help shed some lights on how trade regionalism 
affects the intensity of the regional conflict. However, we admittedly recognize that we present the 
trade-conflict analysis upon some simplifying assumptions. One possible extension is to see how 
differences in production technologies affect the trade equilibrium of two contending countries 
and their optimal arming decisions. It may also be interesting to consider the possibility of trade 
in resources or intermediate inputs. Another potentially interesting extension is to introduce the 
endogeneity of conflict-related destructions into the analysis.34 In this case, resource and output 
destructions affect the production and consumption of final goods and hence the equilibrium terms 
of trade and the volumes of imports and exports. We want to pursue all these issues in our future 
research.   
 
  
                                                 
34For studies on conflict that takes into account the endogeneity of destruction costs see, e.g., Sanders and Walia 
(2014), and Chang, Sanders, and Walia (2015), and Chang and Luo (2013, 2017). 
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Chapter 3 - Free Trade Agreements and The Role of Third Party in 
Interstate Conflict 
 1. Introduction 
 The role that third party plays in influencing interstate conflict has been an important 
research topic of interest to policy makers, economists, and political scientists. Regan (2002) finds 
empirically that third party intervention attempts to limit interstate dispute. Chang and Shane 
(2007) show in a game-theoretic analysis that intervention by a third party can be either peace 
breaking or peace creating. These studies and others35 examine the role of third party, as a conflict 
manager or a military supporter, in aggravating or reducing interstate conflict. Another strand in 
the literature investigates the role that third party plays through the formation of preferential trade 
agreement on interstate conflict. Peterson (2011) shows that third-party trade increases interstate 
hostility in the presence of political dissimilarity between contending countries. In addition, 
Peterson shows empirically that third-party trade with the defender country is conflict-aggravating 
than the third-party trade with the potential aggressor. Considering third-party trade ties with a 
potential aggressor and war initiator, Kinne (2014) shows that a third party has an incentive to 
reduce hostility or conflict between two adversary countries by threatening them through credible 
signaling such as sanctions, embargo, or blockades when trade ties are larger with both of the 
contending countries. Hadjiyiannis, Heracleous, and Tabakis (2016) investigate regionalism and 
conflict. In their theoretical analysis, the authors assume that each contending country's conflict-
related arming is exogenously-given and trade with a neutral or friendly country. The authors show 
that forming a free trade agreement or customs union between one of two adversaries and a friendly 
third party is conflict aggravating. When the two contending countries form a free trade agreement 
or a customs union, the conflict hostility reduces. In other word two contending countries will 
decide to settle their political dispute through peaceful means. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) 
                                                 
35 For studies that analyze the role of third party in interstate conflict see, e.g., Chang, Potter and Shane (2007), 
Amegashie (2010), Amegashie (2014), Amegashie and Kutsoati (2007), Rupen (2002), Cunningham (2016), Arman 
(2010), Sawyer, Katherine, Kathleen Gallagher Cunnningham, and William Reed (2015). 
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document that member states of RTAs are less likely to have armed conflicts than non-member 
states. Liu and Ornelas (2014) show empirically that a country's participation in FTAs enhances 
the sustainability of its democracy. The authors indicate that the mechanism behind the positive 
relationship between trade regionalism and consolidated democracy is “the destruction of rents 
in FTAs” associated with a member state's change in its political regime. Martin, Mayer, and 
Thoenig (2008, 2012) analyze the causes of trade for war and find that enlarging the number of 
members in a regional trade arrangement reduces the economic interdependence between any pair 
of rival states which, in turn, increases the likelihood of bilateral war.36  
 The present paper contributes to the trade regionalism literature by examining the impact 
of third-party trade on interstate conflict. What are optimal arming allocations for national defense 
when a neutral third party forms a free trade agreement (FTA) with only one of the two adversaries, 
Single FTA, as compared to the case when the third party forms a FTA with each of them, multiple 
FTA? What are the conflict-related arming allocations when the bilateral trade is characterized by 
a protectionist regime (with most-favored-nation tariffs)? We wish to analyze these questions by 
developing a trade and conflict model which emphasize the role of third-party trade. First, we 
develop a conflict-trade framework that explicitly characterizes the endogeneity of national 
security and international trade policies optimally chosen by two nation-state adversaries in a four-
stage game. Second, we characterize the equilibrium level of arming and conflict intensity under 
three different trade regimes. A single FTA where the third party form a free trade agreement with 
one single country among the contending countries. A multiple FTA where the third party form a 
free trade agreement with both contending countries. This permits us to investigate how the 
                                                 
36For studies that empirically analyze the correlation between trade and conflict-related issues see, e.g., Polachek 
(1980), Polachek (1992, 1999), Barbieri (1996), Barbieri and Levy (1999), Reuveny and Kang (1998), Polachek, 
Robst, and Chang (1999), Barbieri and Schneider (1999), Anderton and Carter (2001), Mansfield and Pollins (2001), 
Reuveny (2002), Levy and Barbieri (2004), Kim and Rousseau (2005) and Polachek and Seiglie (2007), Glick and 
Taylor (2010). The book by Mansfield and Pollins (2003) contains a collection of interesting studies on trade and 
conflict debate. The seminal work of Polacheck (1980) shows that strengthening the extent of trade openness between 
contending countries can effectively reduce their conflicts in term of overall armament expenditures. This result is 
also found in Oneal and Russet (1999). Nevertheless, some studies such as Kim and Rousseau (2005) find that the 
pacifying effect of greater trade openness can be neutral. Other studies such as  Barbieri (1996) find that extensive 
links through trade may increase the probability of armed conflicts. Barbieri and Levy (1999) show that war does not 
have significant impact on trading relationships between adversaries. It seems that there is no consensus on the trade-
conflict nexus. For theoretical investigations on the relationship between trade and conflict see, e.g., Skaperdas and 
Syropoulos (2001), Garfinkel, Skaperdas, and Syropoulos (2009, 2015), and Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2017). 
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optimal arming decisions of adversaries is affected by the third-party trade, as compared to the 
equilibrium under the protectionist regime.  
Treating national security and international trade policies as endogenous, our results show 
that an increase in arming by each adversary on its domestic welfare contains three effects. The 
first is an “export-revenue effect” of arming, which is welfare increasing since an increase in 
arming increases the prices and revenues of the exported good. The second is “an output-distortion 
effect” of arming which is welfare-reducing since allocating more resource to arming 
unambiguously decreases its final good production for consumption. The third is a “resource-
appropriation effect” of arming which is welfare-increasing because an increase in arming 
increases the amount of final good appropriated from its rival country for domestic consumption.  
We further analyze and compare equilibrium arming allocations of the contending 
countries and the overall conflict intensity under different trade regimes. The main findings are 
summarized as follows. First, the formation of an FTA between a neutral third-party state with 
each of the adversaries leads them to lower their arming allocations despite that they do not trade. 
Thus, third-party trade in the form of multiple FTAs reduces conflict intensity and has a stronger 
pacifying effect than the protectionism regime. Relative to the scenario with multiple FTAs, third-
party trade in the form of a single FTA induces the non-member (or excluded) country to increase 
its arming. Whereas the member country allocates the same level of arming as that under the 
scenario of protectionism regime. The overall allocation of arming is higher under the single PTA 
regime than under the multiple FTA regime. Thus, the single FTA regime is conflict-aggravating.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the three-country 
model of trade and conflict. We determine the equilibrium arming and the intensity of conflict 
under the protectionism regime. Using the latter as benchmark, In Section 3, we analyze the 
scenario where the third country form a multiple FTAs that includes both contending countries. 
Section 4 examines the case where the third party form a single FTAs which exclude one of the 
contending countries.  Section 4 concludes.  
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 2. The Analytical Framework  
 2.1 Basic assumptions and the structure of the game  
We consider a world consists of three large countries, A, B, and C, where A and B are 
"enemies" in that they appropriate each other's resources without trade and country C is a 
politically neutral third party engaging in bilateral trade with A and B.  Each country is endowed 
with R  units of resource (or intermediate input) that can be used to produce a country-specific 
final good for consumption or exportation. Our objective is to analyze how the two adversary 
countries (A and B) determine their productive and appropriative activities when the third party 
(C) may decide to sign a preferential trade agreement with one of the adversary countries or both. 
Each of the three countries specializes in the production of a final good in its own country 
name. That is, A, B, and C, produce country-specific goods ,a ,b and ,c respectively. For bilateral 
trade between C and A or between C and B, we consider an import competing scenario. In our 
analysis, country A produces good ,a  appropriates good b  from country B, and imports good c  
from country C. Similarly, country B produces good ,b  appropriate good a  from country A, and 
import good c  from country C. The neutral country, C, produces good c  and imports both goods 
a  and .b  We adopt a linear production technology for each country that one of a specific resource 
(or input) is required to produce one unit of final good in its specialization. 
Owing to resource appropriation possibilities under interstate conflict, countries A and B 
arm for national security or defense by allocating certain amounts of their endowment resources. 
We consider a simple military technology that one unit of an endowed resource produces one unit 
of an armament. Let ( 0)AG   and ( 0)BG   represent resources allocated to the production of 
weapons by A and B, respectively. The national security policy of a country is a broader concept 
to include such dimensions as military, economics, environment, energy, technology, etc. For 
analytical simplicity, a country's national security policy is captured by its conflict-related arming 
allocation. The probability that each contending country is able to retain its resource in the event 
of fighting is represented by a canonical “contest success function” (CSF) that reflects the 




















A B =  =  for 0.A BG G= =        (1b) 
While engaging in appropriation activities, countries A and B incur a fixed exogenous 
destruction cost .K  Country A loses AK  units of good a  and country B loses BK units of good 
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where the first term on the right-hand side represents the amount of the domestic resource retained 










       (2b) 
where the first term in the right-hand side represents the amount of the domestic resource retained 
after fighting against A. 
Since country C is a neutral third-party, it engages in bilateral trade with A and B. As such, 
the total production of final good c  is equal to R. 
With respect to preferences over the final goods for consumption, we assume that demand 
for good ( , , )i i a b c=  in the country ( , , )j j A B C=  is taken to be linear:  
,
j j
i iQ P = −            (3a) 
where
j
iP  is the price of good i  in country ,j  ( )R  , and 0.   Corresponding to the market 
demands in (3a), it is easy to verify that consumer surplus (CS) for country j  is: 
 2 2 2
1
[( ) ( ) ( ) ].
2
jj j j
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −     (3) 
As for producer surplus, we first look at the adversary countries, A and B. Considering the 
resource appropriation possibilities, we have producer surplus for A and B as follows:  
( )
A
A A A A
a a b A B
G




  and ( ) .
B
B B B B
b b a A B
G




  (4) 
                                                 
37 As in Hadjiyiannis et al (2016), we assume that 
AK and 
BK  are fixed costs of destruction to A and B. 
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The first term on the LHS of each equation in (4) is the market value of a good produced 




bX  are given in (2). The second term on the LHS of each 
equation measures the market value of a good that is appropriated from an enemy country. Since 
C is a neutral country, its producer surplus is measured by the market value of the final good c
that the country produces using its own endowment R. That is, 
.C CcPS P R=            (5) 
Under the shadow of resource appropriation, countries A and B determine their optimal 
arming allocations (security policy) and tariffs (trade policy) to maximize their respective social 
welfare ( ).jSW
 
Country C, however, determine only an optimal trade policy, to maximize its social 
welfare. As in the literature, social welfare for each country is taken as the sum of consumer 
surplus, producer surplus, and tariff revenues ( ).jTR
 
That is,  
j j j jSW CS PS TR= + +  for { , , },j A B C       (6) 
where jCS and jPS  are given in (3)-(5). The total amount of tariff revenues depends on the trade 
regime adopted by each country, and the amounts of resources allocated to arming for the two 
adversaries. 
To analyze how third-party trade in the form of a free trade agreement affects the optimal 
arming decisions of the adversaries, we consider a sequential-move game. At stage one, country 
C may commit to form a free trade agreement with one of the adversary countries or both, or the 
third-party trade may take the form of a protectionist regime (with most-favored-nation tariffs). At 
stage two, the two adversaries determine optimal arming allocations to maximize their respective 
social welfare. At stage three, the three countries set their tariffs (depending on the regime type 
adopted in the first stage of commitment) and engage in trade. To derive the sub-game perfect 
equilibrium for each trade regime, we use backward induction.  
 
 2.2 Third-party trade in the form of a protectionist regime 
The protectionism regime will serve as a benchmark for evaluating two alternative regimes. 
One is when country C forms a preferential trade agreement with each of the adversary countries. 
The other is when country C forms an FTA with only one of the adversaries. Under protectionism 
regime, denote 
j
i  as the tariff rate that each j  imposes on its import of final good .i   
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We begin our analysis with the fourth and last stage of the game at which the two 
contending countries, A and B, engage in bilateral trade for final goods with Country C.  
To maintain the patterns of trade and final good specialization, we note the comparative 
advantage principle that the price of a good in an exporting country plus a specific tariff imposed 
on the good by an importing country can never be lower than the good's price in the importing 
country. This principle excludes the possibilities of arbitrage activities in the three-country world 
(Bagwell and Staiger, 1997, 1999). For good a  that country A manufactures and exports, we have 
the following no-arbitrage condition: 
,A C Ca a aP P+ =          (7) 
where 
C
a  is tariff imposed by countries C on good .a  We solve for the equilibrium price of good 
a  in country A by equating the good's aggregate demand with its aggregate supply. That is, trade 
equilibrium for good a  requires that  
( ) ( ) ( )3 .
A
A C A A
a a A B
G
P P G K
G G
   − + − = − −
+
     (8) 
For analytical tractability, in (8), we assume that R  is equals 3 as in Hadjiyiannis et al 
(2016). Substituting 
C
aP  in terms 
A
aP  from (7) into the equilibrium condition in (8), we solve for 
the market price of good a in country A. This yield 
1
{2 [( )3 ]}.
2
A
A C A A






= − − − −
+
     (9a) 
Using A
aP  in (9a) and the conditions in (7), we calculate the market price of good a  in country C 
1
{2 [( )3 ]}.
2
A
C C A A






= + − − −
+
     (9b) 
The market price of good a  in country B is determined by setting the amount of good a  that 























        (9c) 
62 
Similarly, for good b  that country B manufactures and exports, the no-arbitrage condition 
is: 
,B C Cb b bP P+ =           (10) 
where 
C
b  is tariff that country, C imposes on good b . Trade equilibrium for good b  requires that  
( ) ( ) ( )3 .
B
B C B B
b b A B
G
P P G K
G G
   − + − = − −
+
     (11) 
Substituting 
C
bP  in terms of 
B
bP  from (10) into the equilibrium condition in (11), we solve for the 
equilibrium market price of good b  in country B: 
1
{2 [( )3 ]}.
2
B
B C B B






= − − − −
+
     (12a) 
Using 
B
bP  in (12a) and the conditions in (10), we have the equilibrium market price of good b  in 
country C: 
1
{2 [( )3 ]}.
2
B
C C B B






= + − − −
+
     (12b) 
The market price of good b  in country A is determined by setting the amount of good b  that 























         (12c)  
As for good c  in country C, trade equilibrium requires that 
( ) ( ) ( ) 3,A B Cc c cP P P     − + − + − =         (13) 
where 
A
cP  and 
B
cP satisfy the non-arbitrary conditions:  
C A A
c c cP P+ =   and  .
C B B
c c cP P+ =          (14) 
Making use of (13) and (14), we calculate the market prices of good c  in the three countries as 



























   

− + −
=    (15) 
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In the third stage, the three countries independently and simultaneously determine their 
optimal tariffs. Given that the enemy countries do not trade, country A’s total revenue from 
imposing tariffs, ,
A
c on goods c is: 
,A A Ac cTR Q=           (16a) 
where 
A
cQ  is A’s import demand for the good.  That is, ( ).
A A
c cQ P = −   
 
 3.3 The Endogeneity of Security and Trade Polices 
Substituting the goods' prices from (9), (12), and (15) into ACS  in (3), APS  in (4), and 
ATR in (16a), we can calculate country A's social welfare ( )
A A A ASW CS PS TR= + +  in terms of 
tariff rates, { , , , },
A B C C
c c a b     and arming allocations, { , }.
A BG G  In the third-party trade between 
A and C, the government of country A determines an optimal tariff, ,
A
c  on good c  to maximize 
its domestic welfare, .
ASW  The optimal tariff is determined by solving the first-order condition: 
(FOC): 0,
A A










= +          (17) 
As for country B, its total revenue from imposing tariffs, ,
B
c on goods c is: 
,B B Bc cTR Q=            (18) 
where 
B
cQ  is B’s import demand for the good. That is, ( ).
B B
c cQ P = −  Substituting the goods' 
prices from (9), (12), and (15) into 
BCS  in (3), 
BPS  in (4), and BTR in (18a), we can calculate 
country B's social welfare ( )
B B B BSW CS PS TR= + +  in terms of tariff rates, { , , , },
A B C C
c c a b     
and the arming allocations, { , }.
A BG G  In the third-party trade between B and C, the government 
of country B determines an optimal tariff, ,
B
c  on good c  to maximize its domestic welfare, 
.BSW  The optimal tariff is determined by solving the FOC: 0,
B B











= +          (19) 
Country C’s total revenue from imposing tariffs, { , },
C C
a b  on goods a and b is: 
,C C C C Ca a b bTR Q Q = +         (20a) 
where 
C
aQ   and 
C
bQ  are given, respectively, as 
( )C Ca aQ P = −  and ( ).
C C
b bQ P = −       (20b) 
Substituting the  market prices of the goods from (9), (12), and (15), into CCS  in (3), CPS  
in (5), and CTR  in (20a), Country B determine the optimal tariff 
B
c  that maximize 
BSW  in (6) 
taken as given the arming allocations of the contending countries at the second stage and two other 
countries' tariff rates at the third stage of the four-stage game, The FOC yields the following tariffs:  
(3 )
3 ( ) 3
A B A A
C
a A B
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   (21) 
Making use of (17), (19), and (21), the optimal tariffs set by the three countries under the 
protectionist regime (PR):  
, (3 ) ,
3 ( ) 3
A B A A
C PR
a A B








, (3 ) ,
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b A B




















=         (22) 
The results in (22) suggest that tariffs imposed by two enemy countries on their imports 
from a third party are independent of their arming allocations (for national defense or resource 
appropriations) and the destructiveness of war (as measured by the parameter K). This is consistent 
with our presumption that the third party is a political neutral country such that the trade policy 
decisions of two adversaries with a neutral country are isolated from their arming decisions. In 
contrast, the neutral country's trade policy depends on the amount of arming allocated by the two 
contending countries and the destruction cost.  






















































The findings in (23) can be summarized by the first proposition as follows: 
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PROPOSITION 1. Under the protectionist regime in a three-country world where two countries 
appropriate each other’s resources without trade, but each has a bilateral trade relationship with 
a politically neutral third country, the most-favored-nation tariffs imposed by the latter are lower 
the higher the arming allocations of the two adversaries and the higher the destructiveness of 
armed conflict. 
Proposition 1 shows that, all else being equal, third party reacts to arming increase of the 
two adversaries by reducing tariffs on imports from them. The economic intuitions behind such 
tariff reductions are as follows. An increase in arming by each of the two enemy countries lowers 
the amounts of their resources available to produce the country-specific consumption goods (a and 
b). This implies that the international prices of the consumption goods will be higher. To mitigate 
the possible increase in the domestic prices of the consumption goods imported from the two 
contending countries, it is to the economic benefit of Country C not to increase but to lower the 
tariffs. 
We proceed to the security stage where the adversary countries, A and B, determine arming 
allocations to maximize their social welfare. Under symmetry in all aspects (i.e., 
, ,A PR B PR PRG G G= = and A BK K K= = ), we solve for the optimal arming as follows: 
281 108 288 (64 144 96) 9 1 9
.
16 16 2 8
PR K KG K
  

+ − + + −
= − − +     (24) 
It follows that 




K  −  
The last inequality condition holds when market demand for a good is sufficiently large and the 
destruction cost is critically low. We assume that this condition holds.  














When two enemy countries face higher costs of destruction in fighting, the opportunity 
costs of increasing arming dominate the economic gains from trade. As a result, the enemy 
countries tend to allocate less resources to arming. In contrast, the enemy countries allocate more 
resources to arming when the size of market for each consumption good is large. 
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It is instructive to investigate how a conflicting country's arming affects its social welfare. 
Using Country, A as an example (under the assumption of symmetry), we show in Appendix C-1 
the following welfare decomposition: 
Export-revenue effect Output-distortion effect Resource-appro
         of arming            of arming
              (+)                (-)
[ ( )]
A AA
A A A Aa a B
a a a bA A A A
P X APPSW
X P P P
G G G G
 
  
= − − + +
   
priation effect
                of arming
                     (+)
0.= (25)  
where [ ( )]
A A B
BAPP G G G R= +  for 3R =  is the expected amount of good b  that 
country A appropriates from country B. The impact that each adversary's arming on its domestic 
welfare is summarized by the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2. Under the protectionism regime in a three-country world where two adversary 
countries appropriate each other's resources and engage in trade only with a neutral third party, 
an increase in arming by each adversary on its domestic contains three effects. The first is an 
export-revenue effect of arming, which is welfare increasing. The second is an output-distortion 
effect, which is welfare decreasing. The third is a resource-appropriation effect which is welfare 
increasing. 
The first is an “export-revenue effect” of arming, which is welfare increasing since an 
increase in arming increases the prices and revenues of the exported good. The second is an 
“output-distortion effect” of arming, which is welfare-reducing since allocating more resource to 
arming unambiguously decreases its final good production for consumption. The third is a 
“resource-appropriation effect” of arming, which is welfare-increasing because an increase in 
arming increases the amount of final good appropriated from its rival country for domestic 
consumption. Both the export-revenue effect and the resource-appropriation effect reflect the 
marginal revenue while the output-distortion effect constitutes the marginal cost. The equilibrium 
level of arming that maximizes the overall welfare for each contending country is determined 
where the marginal benefit of arming equals the marginal cost. 
Using the protectionism regime as a benchmark, we analyze how the socially optimal 
arming level, ,G  as well as the intensity of conflict, which is measured by the sum of the level 
of arming by the two contending countries are affected when the third party engage in a 
discriminatory PTA with one of the contending countries. Next, we will analyze the scenario where 
the neutral third party forms a free trade agreement separately with each of the adversary countries.  
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 3. Third-Party Trade in the form of Multiple FTAs 
We proceed to examine how the arming decisions of two adversary countries are affected 
when third-party trade takes the form of multiple FTAs, denoted as " ".M As the analysis under 
the protectionism regime, we consider a three-stage game. At stage one, the third party (C) 
commits to form a multiple FTA with each of the adversary countries (A and B). At stage two, 
countries A and B determine their optimal arming allocations. At stage three, member countries of 
an FTA enjoy duty-free access to each other's markets and engage in third-party trade. We use 
backward induction to solve for the Sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium under multiple FTAs. 
We begin with the third stage of the game by substituting zero tariffs back into equations 
(9), (12), and (15) to obtain the prices of goods a, b, and c in their markets: 
, , 1 3(2 ),
2
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A M C M A A
a a A B
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= = =        (26) 
At the second stage, each contending country determines an arming allocation that 
maximizes its domestic welfare. Making use of the prices in (26), country A’s social welfare 
function is: 
, , , ,A M A M A MSW CS PS= +  where consumer surplus and producer surplus 
respectively are:  
, , 2 , 2 , 21 [( ) ( ) ( ) ],
2
A M A M A M A M
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −  
, , ,[( )3 )] [( )3].
A A
A M A M A A A M
a bA B A B
G G
PS P G K P
G G G G
= − − +
+ +
 
Country B’s social welfare function is: 
, , , ,B M B M B MSW CS PS= + where consumer surplus and 
producer surplus respectively are: 
, , 2 , 2 , 21 [( ) ( ) ( ) ],
2
B M B M B M B M
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −  
, , ,[( )3 )] [( )3].
B B
B M B M B B B M
a bA B A B
G G
PS P G K P
G G G G




The FOCs for A and B are: , 0A M ASW G  =   and , 0,B M BSW G  =  which lead to the Nash 
equilibrium levels of arming, denoted as 
, ,{ , }.A M B MG G   Under symmetry in all dimensions, we 
have , , .A M B M MG G G= =   The optimal arming level is calculated as follows:   
2256 288 783 (144 384 216) 2 1 9
.
24 3 2 8
M K KG K
  

+ − + + −
= − − +    (27) 
Evaluating the derivative ,A M ASW G  and ,B M BSW G  at the point where ,A B PRG G G= = 38  
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Strict concavity of each country's social welfare function implies that 
.M PRG G           (28) 
Equation (28) indicates that multiple FTAs (with the neutral third party forming a free trade 
agreement separately with each of the adversary countries) reduces each adversary's arming. 
Defining conflict intensity (CI) as the aggregation of arming allocations by the two adversaries, 
i.e., ,
A BCI G G= + we have under symmetry that  
.M PRCI CI           (29) 
We, therefore, can state the following:  
PROPOSITION 3. In a three-country world with two adversary countries and a neutral third 
state, the formation of a PTA between the third-party state with each of the adversaries leads them 
to lower their optimal arming allocations despite that they do not trade. Thus, multiple PTAs 
reduces conflict intensity and has a stronger pacifying effect than the protectionism regime. 
A move from trade protectionism to the third-party trade regime with multiple FTAs 
provides an economic incentive for two enemy countries to cut back on their arming allocations. 
Consequently, the overall conflict intensity decreases. To explain the economic intuition behind 
this result, we use the social welfare decomposition developed in section 2. The slope of each 
contending countries social welfare with respect to the level of arming under protectionism regime 
is strictly negative as indicated in equation (28). The strict negativity of the derivative is caused 
                                                 
38Note that we assign some plausible values for (i.e., 0.2)K K = in evaluating the derivative.  
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by the fact that the output-distortion effects, which represent the marginal cost of arming is greater 
than the export-revenue effect and the appropriation effect which constitute the marginal revenue. 
These results derivation can be found in Appendix C-2.    
 
 4.  Third-Party Trade in the form of a Single FTA 
The next step is to analyze how arming decisions of contending countries is affected when 
the third party forms a single FTA with one of the contending countries, A or B. One is interested 
to know how members and non-members allocate their resource to arming under a single FTA. As 
the analysis under the protectionist regime, we consider a four-stage game structure to characterize 
the sub-game perfect equilibrium for the single FTA formed between countries A and C, denoted 
as the " "S  regime. At stage one, Country C commits to form an FTA with A. At stage two, the 
two contending countries independently and simultaneously determine optimal arming allocations 
that maximize their own domestic welfare. At stage three, A and C set zero tariffs ( 0)
A C
c a = =  
on their imports from each other and, in the meanwhile, Simultaneously and independently 
Country C sets an optimal tariff 
C
b on imports from country B. The latter sets an optimal tariff 
,Bc on imports from C. At stage four, Countries A and B engage in trade for final goods with 
country C. 
We make use of equation (9), (12), (15), and ( 0)
A C
c a = = ,  the equilibrium market 
prices of goods a, b, and c are: 
, , 1 {2 [3( ) ]},
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= − − − −
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= − − − +
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=         (30) 
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We proceed to the third stage at which country B sets its optimal tariff 
B
c  on good c  and 
country C sets its optimal tariff 
C
b  on good .b   Given that country A does not engage in trade with 
country B but forms an FTA with country C, we have zero tariffs 0.
A C
c a = =  Making use of the 
prices in (30) and the social welfare function in (6), we can determine the welfare-maximizing 
tariff, , ,B Sc  the country B imposes on good .c  We note that the amount of good c  imported for 
consumption is: , , ,B S B Sc cQ P = −  where 
,B S
cP  is given in (30). After substitution, we have  
,
, , 21 .
3
B S
B S B S c
c cQ P

 = − = −  
Consumer and producer surpluses are:  
, , 2 , 2 , 21 [( ) ( ) ( ) ],
2
B S B S B S B S
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −  
, , ,[( )3 ] [( )3].
B B
B S B S B B B S
b aA B A B
G G
PS P G K P
G G G G
= − − +
+ +
  
Country B's social welfare function is: 
, , , , ,B S B S B S B S B S
c cSW CS PS Q= + +  






















=           (31a) 
Next, we calculate the welfare-maximizing tariff that country C imposes on good .b  Note 
that the amount of good b  imported for consumption is: , , ,C S C Sb bQ P = −  where 
,C S
bP  is given 
in (30). After substitution, we have  
, ,1 [3( ) ] 0.
2
B





= − − − =
+
 
Consumer and producer surpluses are: 
, , 2 , 2 , 21 [( ) ( ) ( ) ],
2
C S C S C S C S
a cbCS P P P     
= − + − + −  
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, ,3 ,C S C ScPS P=  
where the prices of the goods are given in (30). Country C's social welfare function is: 
, , , , ,C S C S C S C S C S
b bSW CS PS Q= + +   






C SB S B B A B
b
C S A B
b





= − − =
 +
 
Solving for the optimal tariff by country B yields   
, (3 ) .
33 ( )
B B A B
C S
b A B







       `(31b) 
We proceed to the second stage of national security at which countries A and B 
independently and simultaneously determine their optimal arming allocations. Substituting the 





















Evaluating the derivative of 
,A SSW  with respect to 












The strict concavity of the social welfare function implies that   
, , .A S A PRG G          (32a) 












which implies that  
, ,B S B PRG G           (32b) 
Equation (32a) indicates that the FTA-member country allocates less resources to arming relative 
the scenario where there is protectionism without any form of trade regionalism. Whereas, 
                                                 
39Note that we assign some plausible values for (i.e., 0.2)K K = in evaluating the derivative.  
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equation (32b) imply that the FTA-non-member country allocate more resources to arming relative 
the protectionism regime. 
We further evaluate the derivative of ,A SSW  with respect to AG at the point where 












which implies that   
, , .A S A MG G=           (33a) 












which implies that  
, ,B S B MG G .          (33b) 
Equation (33a) indicates that the FTA-member country allocates the same level of arming whether 
the third party forms a single or a multiple FTA. Relative to the regime with multiple FTAs, 
equation (33b) imply that the FTA-non-member country allocate more resources to arming. Under 
symmetry in all dimension, we have the following:   
.S MCI CI            (34) 
We therefore have: 
PROPOSITION 4. Relative to the institutional setting of multiple FTAs between a third party 
with each of the adversary countries, a single FTA in the form of an FTA between the third party 
and only one of the adversaries induces the non-member or excluded country to increase its 
optimal level of arming. Whereas the member country allocates the same level of arming. The 
overall allocation of arming is higher under the single FTA regime than under the multiple FTA 
regime. Thus, the single FTA regime is conflict-aggravating 
The economic intuition in proposition 4 is straightforward. Using the welfare 
decomposition approach developed in Section 2. The slope of the FTA-non-member country social 
welfare with respect to the level of arming under multiple FTAs is strictly positive as explained in 
Appendix C-3. The strict positivity of the derivative is caused by the fact that the export-revenue 
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effect and the resource-appropriation effect which constitute the marginal revenue exceed the 
output-distortion effects, which represent the marginal cost of arming.  
 
 5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we develop a trade-conflict model to analyze the impacts of third party 
through preferential trade agreement on interstate conflict. Contrary to the existing literature on 
trade and conflict, our paper is the first to endogenous the security and trade policies. Our results 
have policy implication on the formation of regional trade agreement for interstate conflict. We 
show that an increase in arming by each member of the two-contending countries contains three 
effect on the domestic welfare. The first is an “export-revenue effect” of arming, which is welfare 
increasing. The second is “an output-distortion effect” of arming which is welfare-reducing. The 
third is a “resource-appropriation effect” of arming which is welfare-increasing.  
We further analyze and compare equilibrium arming allocations of the contending 
countries and the conflict intensity under different trade regimes. We find that the formation of an 
FTA between the third-party state with each of the adversaries leads them to lower their optimal 
arming allocations despite that they do not trade. Thus, multiple FTAs reduces conflict intensity 
and has a stronger pacifying effect than the protectionism regime. Relative to the institutional 
setting of multiple FTAs between a third party with each of the adversary countries, a single FTA 
in the form of an FTA between the third party and only one of the adversaries induces the non-
member or excluded country to increase its optimal level of arming. Whereas the member country 
allocates the same level of arming as under the scenario of protectionism regime. The overall 
allocation of arming is higher under the single PTA regime than under the multiple FTA regime. 
Thus, the single FTA regime is conflict-aggravating. Our finding in this paper has policy 
implications on the formation of regional trade agreement on interstate conflict 
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Appendix A - Appendix of Chapter 1 
A-1.  Equilibrium prices, consumer surplus, and producer surplus 
After substituting AX  from (2a) and BY  from (2b) into the final good prices in (11), we 
have:  
( ) (2 )( )
,
2( )
A A B A A B
X
A B
G G G Z R t G G
P
G G
+ − + − − +
=
+
     (a.1) 
( ) (2 )( )
.
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B A B B A B
Y
A B
G G G Z R t G G
P
G G
+ − + − + +
=
+
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( ) (2 )( )
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B A B B A B
Y
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G G G Z R t G G
H
G G
+ − + − − +
=
+
      (a.4) 
Substituting these equilibrium prices into the demand equations in (3), we then use 
equations (4) and (5) to calculate consumer and producer surplus.  For country A, we have   
2 2
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1
,
2 2( ) 2 2( )
A A B A A B B B A A A B
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For country B, we have  
2 2
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81 
 
A-2. Decomposing the effect of country A's arming 
Making use of A ACS G   in (14) and A APS G   in (15), the effect of country A's 
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The above derivative can further be re-written as 
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Similarly, country B determines an arming allocation BG
 







SW CS PS= +
 
where BCS and BPS  are consumer and producer 
surplus as given in Appendix A-1. We decompose the effect of country B's arming into three 
separate terms: 
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where ( )Y B YE Y D −  is the amount of the final good Y exported from B to A. 
Alternatively, we can use (14)-(16) to decompose the effect of country A's arming into 
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where ,AX  ,XD ,YM and XP  are functions of AG  and .BG That expression implies that 
country A increases its arming up to where marginal benefit equals marginal cost, that is,  
( )
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A B A B A B
G G G Z G G G ZG Z
X D M P
G G G G G G
   + − + −
   − = +
   + + +   
     
As for country B, we have the following FOC:  
( )
( )








A B A A B AB A
B Y X Y
B A B A B A B
G G G Z G G G ZSW G Z
Y D M P
G G G G G G G
   + − + −
   = − − − =
    + + +   
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Country B's arming likewise is chosen where marginal benefit equals marginal cost, namely,  
( )
( )





B's marginal revenue of arming B's marginal cost of arming
.
2 2
A B A A B AA
B Y X Y
A B A B A B
G G G Z G G G ZG Z
Y D M P
G G G G G G
   + − + −
   − = +
   + + +   
       
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1 
For country A, 0A ASW G    when ( )X X AE P G   is less than the sum of 
( )Y Y AM P G−   and ( )X A AP X G   in absolute value. That is, .
Arms Arms
A AMR MC   Similarly, 
0B BSW G    when .
Arms Arms
B BMR MC   As a result, we have 0.A BG G= =   Q.E.D. 
A.4 Comparative statics of the equilibrium arming under symmetry 
Taking the derivative of G  (18) with respect to Z , R, and t, respectively, we have the 
following derivatives:    
6 16 10 5
0,
12
G R Z t K
Z K







G R Z t K
R K




(6 5 8 2 )
0.
6
G R Z t K
t K




A-5. Social welfare functions under asymmetry in national endowments 
Substituting ( )A oR R = +  and ( )B oR R = −  into (a.5) and (a.6) in Appendix A-1, we  
have the following social welfare functions for countries A and B:   
2 2
( , ; )
( , ; ) ( , ; )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1
2 2( ) 2 2( )
(2 )( ) ( )
   ( )
2 ( )
A A B
A A B A A B
A A B o A B B B A o A B
A B A B
o A B A A B A
o A
A B A B
SW G G
CS G G PS G G
G Z G G R t G G G Z G G R t G G
G G G G
R t G G G Z G G G
R G








   − − + + + + − − + − − +
= +   
+ +   
   − − − + − − −
+ + − +   









( , ; )
( , ; ) ( , ; )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1
2 2( ) 2 2( )
(2 )( ) ( )
   ( )
2 ( )
B A B
B A B B A B
B A B o A B A A B o A B
A B A B
o A B B A B B
o B
A B A B
SW G G
CS G G PS G G
G Z G G R t G G G Z G G R t G G
G G G G
R t G G G Z G G G
R G Z








   − − + − + + − − + − +
= +   
+ +   
   − + + + − − −
+ − − +   







Appendix B - Appendix of Chapter 2 
B-1. Market equilibrium condition for good a in country A  
Alternatively, we have the following equilibrium condition:  
( ) [( ) ( )3] ( ) ( )3 .
B A
A B C A A
a a aA B A B
G G
P P P G K
G G G G
     − + − − + − = − −
+ +
 (a.1) 
The second bracket term on the LHS of equation (a.1) is consumption of good a by country B,  ( ),BaP −
minus the quantity of the good that B appropriates from A, [ ( )]3.
B A BG G G+  This difference gives the 
amount of good a  that country B imports from country A. The term on the RHS of equation (a.1) is the 
quantity of good a supplied by country A, which is given by 
A
aZ  in (2).  It is easy to verify that equation 
(a.1) is precisely identical to equation (8). 
 
B-2. Market equilibrium condition for good b in country B 
Alternatively, we have the following equilibrium condition:   
 [( ) ( )3] ( ) ( ) ( )3 .
A B
A B C B B
b b bA B A B
G G
P P P G K
G G G G
     − − + − + − = − −
+ +
 (a.2) 
The first bracket term on the LHS of equation (a.2) is the consumption of good b by country A,   
( ),AbP −  minus the amount of the good that A appropriates from B, [ ( )]3.
A A BG G G+  This difference 
then gives the quantity of good b  that country A imports from country B. The term on the RHS of equation 
(a.2) is the quantity of good b supplied by country B as given by 
B
bZ  in (2).  It is easy to verify that equation 
(a.2) is precisely identical to equation (11). 
 
B-3. Comparative static results for the protectionist regime 
Based on the optimal tariffs under the protectionist regime as shown in equation (22), we have the following 





































































































































7 7 ( )
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A PR C PR










7 7 ( )
B B A
B PR C PR










B-4. Decomposing the welfare effect of arming for a contending country under the protectionist regime 
 Under symmetry, we can look at country A. The country's welfare function is: 
2 2 2
           
1
[( ) ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( )] ( ),
2
A A A A
A A A A A A A A A A A
a b c a a b b b b c c
SW CS PS TR
P P P P Z P APP M M       

= + +
= − + − + − + + + +
 
where [ ( )]3
A A A B
bAPP G G G= +  is the amount of good b appropriated by country A.  Taking the 
derivative of 
ASW  with respect to 
AG  yields   
( )
[ ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ]
A A A A AAA
A A A A A Aa b a b b
a b a a b bA A A A A A A
P P P P APPZSW
P P Z P APP P
G G G G G G G
   
    
= − − − − + + + +
          
               
( ).
A A A A
A A A Ab c b c
b c b cA A A A
M M
M M
G G G G
 
 
   
+ + + +
   
 
Note that changes in country A's arming do not affect 
A
cM  and .
A
c  That is 0
A A
cM G  =  and 
0.A Ac G  =  Note also that country A's import demand for good b is given by its total consumption of 
good b minus the amount of the good appropriated, i.e., ( ) .
A A
b b bM P A = − −  We incorporate the zero 
derivatives and this definition into the derivative, after re-arranging terms.  This exercise yields  
 
( )
[ ( )] [( ) ] .
A A A A AA A
A A A A A A Aa b b b b
a a b b b a bA A A A A A A
P M P APPSW Z
Z P M M P P
G G G G G G G

  
     
= − − + + − + +
      
        
                 (a.3)           
This derivative contains four different terms:  











 reflects a terms-of-trade effect of arming, which is welfare-
increasing since [ ( )] 0
A A










(ii) The second bracket term [( ) ]
A A A
A A Ab b b









 reflects the (net) effect of country A's 




( ) [ 3 ] [ ] 0.
( ) 7 ( )
A A B B
A A A Ab b
b b b bA A A B A B
M G G
M M





+ = − + − 
  + +
    
We also consider how arming affects the price of good b in country A which is .
A A
bP G   This derivative 




A A Ab b b









is thus unambiguously negative.  









 reflects an output distortion effect since allocating more resource to arming 
lowers the amount of resource for final good production and consumption, which is welfare-reducing.    








 is a resource appropriation effect, which is welfare-increasing.  
It follows from (a.3) that we can decompose the effect of country A's arming on its overall welfare into four 
different effects as follows: 
  
Export-revenue effect Resource-appropriation effect
         of arming                 of arming





A A Aa b





   = − − +
   
Output-di  Tariff-revenue & import-spending effect
                          of arming
                                (-)
           ( ) +
A A A A
A A A Ab b b a
b b b aA A A A
M P Z
M M P
G G G G


    
+ + − 
     
stortion effect
                of arming




B-5. Optimal arming is lower under the FTA (A&B) regime than under worldwide free trade 
We evaluate the slopes of the welfare functions iSW  (for , )i A B=  under the WFT regime at the 
equilibrium arming allocations under the FTA(A&B) regime, 
, ( & ) , ( & ){ , }.A FTA A B B FTA A BG G   With symmetry 
that 
, ( & ) , ( & ) ( & ) ,A FTA A B B FTA A B FTA A BG G G= =  we just look at country A. Since 0
A B
b a = =  under the 
FTA(A&B) regime, we have from the welfare decomposition in (24) that the FOC for country A is: 
 
, ( & )( & )
, ( & ), ( & )
, ( & )
[ ( )]
                          0,
A FTA A B AFTA A B
A FTA A BA A FTA A B a b
a a bA A A
A















   
where [3 ( )]
A A A B
bAPP G G G= +  is the amount of good b appropriated by country A. Next, we derive 
results for each of the terms in the above FOC. Substituting 
, ( & ) (3 ) 8A FTA A Ba
A
AG K = − −  from (26a) 
into 
, ( & )A FTA A B
aP  in (25) yields  
, ( & ) 3 3 8 3 3 9 ,
3 8
A A C A A
A FTA A B a
a




+ + − − + + −
= =     (a.4) 
which implies that  












         (a.5) 
The appropriation of good b by country A,  [3 ( )],
A A A B














         (a.6) 
Country A's production of good a, [3 ( )]
A A A B A A













          (a.7) 
Substituting (3 ) (8 )
C
b
B BG K = − −  from (26c) into 
, ( & )A FTA A B
bP  in (25) yields  
, ( & ) 3 3 8 3 3 9
.
3 8
B B C B B
A FTA A B b
b




+ + − − + + −
= =    (a.8) 




         of arming
              (+)
2
Resource-appropriation effe
3 3 8 3 3 9
( ) [ ( )]
8 8
3 8 3 3 9
( )
8( )















  + + −
= − − − − 





                of arming                 of arming
                     (+)                      (-)
3 8 3 3 9













( & ).A B FTA A BG G G= =  
Under the WFT regime, the slope of country A's welfare function with respect to its arming is: 
  
,
, , ,[ ( )] ,
A WFT AWFT
A A WFT A WFT A WFTa b a
a a abA A A A
P APP ZSW
Z P P P
G G G G
 
  
= − − + +
   
 where 




























































































   
 
After substituting, we have 
 
Export-revenue effect
         of arming
              (+)
2
Resource-appropriation effect
       
1 3 3 3




















  + + −
= − − − − 





         of arming                 of arming













   (a.10) 
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where .A B WFTG G G= =   We evaluate 
WFT ASW G   in (a.10)  at the FTA(A&B) equilibrium arming 
allocations where  
( & ) ,A B FTA A BG G G= = taking into account the FOC as shown in (a.9).  We have   
(i) Comparing the export-revenue effect  
  
2
1 3 3 3
( ) [ ( )]
3 3
3 3 8 3 3 9
( ) [ ( )]
8 8


























 + + −
− − − − 
+  
 + + −
− − − − − 
+  








3 3 3 3 8 3 3 9
( ) ( )




B B B B B B
A B A B
B B B
A B
G G K G G K


















3 3 3 3 8 3 3 9
[ 1]( ) [ 1]( )
3 8( ) ( )
[( ) ( ) 2 3 ](3 )
0
24 ( )
B A A B A A
A B A B
A B A B B A A
A B
G G K G G K
G G G G





+ + − + + −
− − −
+ +




Putting together the three effects, we have under symmetry (
( & )A B FTA A BG G G= = )  that 
( & )
( & ) ( & ) ( & )2
( & )
[31( ) 93 31 36 108]
0.
576FTA A BA BG G G
FTA A B FTA A B FTA A BWFT
A FTA A B
G G G K KSW
G G= =




The strict concavity of the social welfare function implies the optimal arming under the FTA(A&B) regime 
is lower than that the worldwide free trade regime. That is, 
( & ) .FTA A B WFTG G  Starting from the 
FTA(A&B) regime, a move to the WFT regime will encourage each contending country to increase arming 
since the export-revenue effect plus the resource-appropriation effect (i.e., marginal revenue of arming) 
exceed the output-distortion effect (i.e., the marginal cost of arming). 
 
B-6.  Optimal arming allocations of two adversary countries that from a CU 
For the scenario where there is a CU between countries A and B, denoted as the CU(A&B) regime, we have 
, ( & ) , ( & ) 0.A CU A B B CU A Bb a = =  At the trade policy stage, A and B jointly determine a common external 
optimal tariff, denoted as 
, ( & )m CU A B
c , on their imports of good c. Simultaneously, country C sets an optimal 
tariff structure,  ,C Ca b  , on its imports of good a and b. Making use of the price equations in (9), (12) and 
(15) and considering that 




, ( & ) , ( & ) 3 (3 ) ,
3
C A A






− − − −
= =  
 










− − − −
= =  
 
, ( & ) 3 2 (3 ) ,
3
C A A






+ − − −
=










+ − − −
=  
 
, ( & )
, ( & ) 3 3 ,
3
m CU A B






, ( & )
, ( & ) 3 3 ,
3
m CU A B







, ( & )
, ( & ) 3 2 3.
3
m CU A B





=      
In determining their common external tariff on the import of good c, countries A and B jointly maximize 
the aggregate social welfare: 
& , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) ,A B CU A B A CU A B B CU A BSW SW SW= +  
 here 
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) ,A CU A B A CU A B A CU A B m CU A B A CU A Bc bSW CS PS M= + +  (a.11) 
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) .B CU A B B CU A B B CU A B m CU A B B CU A Bc bSW CS PS M= + +  (a.12) 
The FOC for the joint welfare maximization problem implies that the common external tariff on good c is: 
, ( & ) 6 .
5




         
(a.13) 
Similarly, country C determines an optimal tariff structure,{ , },
C C
a b  to maximize its domestic welfare:  
, ( & ) , ( & ), ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) C CU A B C CU A BC CU A B C CU A B C CU A B C CU A B C CU A B
a a b bSW CS PS M M = + + +  
The FOCs for country C imply that the optimal tariffs are:  
, ( & ) (3 )
8
A A






=  and  
, ( & ) (3 )
8
B B







    
(a.14) 
We proceed to the security stage at which A and B independently and simultaneously determine their 
optimal arming decisions. Substituting the optimal tariffs from (a.13) and (a.14) into the welfare functions 
in (a.11) and (a.12), we have the FOCs for A and B:  
 
, ( & )
0







  and 
, ( & )
0.








Denote the Nash equilibrium levels of arming as 
, ( & ) , ( & ){ , }.A CU A B B CU A BG G  Under symmetry in all 
dimensions, have 
, ( & ) , ( & ) ( & ).A CU A B B CU A B CU A BG G G= =  Calculating the optimal arming yields 
2
( & ) 4096 3159 (1521 4992 3510) 32 3 .
78 39 2 2
CU A B K K KG
  − + + −
= − − +  
It is easy to verify that
( & ) ( & ).FTA A B CU A BG G=  
Evaluating the slope 
, ( & )A CU A B ASW G   at the point where ,A A PRG G= , we have    
,
, ( & )
0,A A PR








which implies that  
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, ( & ) , ( & ) ( & ) , .A CU A B B CU A B CU A B A PRG G G G= =   
 
B-7.  One contending country and a neutral third country form a CU 
For the scenario where there is a CU between countries A and C, denoted as the CU(A&C) regime, we 
have 
, ( & ) , ( & ) 0.A CU A C C CU A Cc a = =  At the trade policy stage, countries A and C jointly determine a 
common external tariff, demoted as 
, ( & ) ,m CU A Cb on their imports of good b. Simultaneously, country B 
sets an optimal tariff structure, { , },B Ba c   on its imports of goods a and c. Making use of the price 
equations in (9), (12) and (15) and considering that 
, ( & ) , ( & ) 0,A CU A C C CU A Cc a = =  the equilibrium prices 
under the CU(A&C) regime are: 
 
, ( & ) , ( & ) 3 (3 ) ,
3
B A A






− − − −
= =  
 
, ( & )
, ( & ) , ( & ) 3 3 ,
3
b CU A C





= =    
, ( & ) 3 2 (3 ) ,
3
B A A






+ − − −
=  
, ( & )
, ( & ) 3 (3 )
,
3
m CU A C B B






+ − − −
=   
 
, ( & )
, ( & ) 3 2 (3 )
,
3
m CU A C B B






− − − −
=   
 
, ( & )
, ( & ) 3 (3 )
,
3
m CU A C B B






+ − − −










=     
In determining their tariff on the import of good b, countries A and C set a common external tariff that 
maximizes their aggregate welfare: 
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & )AC CU A C A CU A C C CU A CSW SW SW= +  where  
      
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) ,A CU A C A CU A C A CU A C m CU A C A CU A Cb bSW CS PS M= + +  
      
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ).C CU A C C CU A C C CU A C m CU A C C CU A Cb bSW CS PS M= + +  
 The FOC for the joint welfare maximization problem is: 
, ( & ) , ( & ) 0.AC CU A C m CU A CSW   =  
Solving for the optimal common external tariff yields 
, ( & ) 2 (3 ) 3 2 ( ) .
5 ( )
B A B A B A B
m CU A C
b A B




− − − − +
=
+     
(a.15) 
Similarly, country B determines an optimal tariff structure,{ , },B Ba c  to maximize its domestic welfare: 
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & )B CU A C B CU A C B CU A C B CU A C B CU A C B CU A C B CU A C
a a c cSW CS PS M M = + + +
Making use of the FOCs for country B, we solve for its optimal tariffs: 
, ( & ) (3 ) 6 ( )
8 ( )
A A B B A A B
B CU A C
a A B








, ( & ) 3 .
8






We proceed to the security stage at which countries A and B independently and simultaneously make their 
arming decisions. Country A determines an optimal arming, denoted as 
, ( & ) ,A CU A CG  that maximizes its 
social welfare:  
 
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ).A CU A C A CU A C A CU A C m CU A C A CU A Cb bSW CS PS M= + +  
Evaluating the slope  
, ( & )A CU A C ASW G   at the point where ,A A PRG G= , we have  
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 ,
, ( & )
0,A A PR








The strict concavity of the social welfare function implies that  
 
, ( & ) , .A CU A C A PRG G  
As for country B, it determines an optimal arming, denoted as 
, ( & ) ,B CU A CG  that maximizes its welfare:   
 
, ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) , ( & ) .B CU A C B CU A C B CU A C B B CU A C B B CU A Cc c a aSW CS PS M M = + + +  
Evaluating the slope 
, ( & )B CU A C ASW G   at the point where ,B B PRG G= , we have  
 ,
, ( & )
0,B B PR








which implies that 
, ( & ) , .B CU A C B PRG G  
 
Appendix C - Appendix of Chapter 3 
C-1. Decomposing the welfare effect of arming for a contending country 
 
 Under symmetry, we look at country' A welfare effect of arming and show that it can be decomposed into 
three different effects.  Country A's social welfare under the protectionist regime is: 
, ,P , , ,A PR A R A PR A PRSW CS PS TR= + +  which implies that       
, , 2 2 , 2 , , , , ,1 [( ) ( ) ( ) ] ,
2
A PR A PR A PR A PR A PR A PR A PR A PR
a b c a a b b c cSW Q APP Q P X P APP Q

= + + + + +  
noting that bAPP  is the amount of final good b appropriated by country A for consumption.  Taking 
the derivative of 
,A PRSW  with respect to ,
AG  we have  
, , , ,,





                 .
A PR A PR A PR A PRA PR
A PR A PR A PR A PRa b c a a
a b c a aA A A A A A
A PR A PR A PR
A PR A PR A PRb c cB
b b c cA A A A
Q APP Q P XSW
Q APP Q X P
G G G G G G
P QAPP
P APP Q




    
= + + + +
     
  
+ + + +
   
 
For several terms on the right-hand side of the above equation, we note the following conditions: 
(i) 









;       
(ii) 
, , ,
, , , 0
A PR A PR A PR
A PR A PR A PRc c c











cQ  and 
,A PR





































Taking into account of (i) - (iii), the derivative of 
,A PRSW  with respect to 
AG  becomes:  
 
, ,,
, , , ,( ) .
A PR A PRA PR
A PR A PR A PR A PRa a B
a a a bA A A A
P X APPSW
X Q P P
G G G G
  
= − + +




The impact that an adversary country's arming on its overall welfare thus contains three different effects:  












 represents the export-revenue effect of arming,  











 constitutes the output-distortion effect of arming, and  
 (3) the third term, 






 reflects the resource-appropriation effect of arming.  
 
C-2. Optimal arming is lower under multiple FTAs than under the protectionism regime 
We will evaluate the slope of the 
,A MSW  under Multiple FTAs at the equilibrium arming allocations under 
the protectionism regime.  
  
, ,,
, , , ,( )
A PR A PRA PR
A PR A PR A PR A PRa a b
a a a bA A A A
P X APPSW
X Q P P
G G G G
  
= − + +
   
         
(i) Comparing the export revenue effect 
 
Evaluating the following expression:      
 
, ,
, , , ,( ) ( )
A M A PR
A M A M A PR A PRa a
a a a aA A
P P
X Q X Q
G G
  
− − − 
  
      (a.1)  
at  
, , ,A PR B PRG G G= =  
where  
 
, (2 6 3 ) 3 2 2 ( ) ,
3 ( )
A A B A B A A B
A PR
a A B





− + + + + +
=
+



















− − − 




( ) (2 3)
,
2 ( )
A MFTA A B A B
a
A A B
P G G G G
G G G







2[ ( 2 ) ( 3)]
.
3 ( )
A PR A A B B B
a
A A B
P G G G G G
G G G






After substituting (a.2) and (a.3) back into (a.1), we have under symmetry the following result: 
 
, ,
, , , , (4 3)(2 2 3)( ) ( ) 0
288
A M A PR
A M A M A PR A PRa a
a a a aA A
P P G G K
X Q X Q
G G G
  − + −
− − − = − 
 
   
 
(ii) Comparing the distortion-effect of arming: 
 












           (a.4)  
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we evaluate it at the point where 
, ,A PR B PRG G G= =   
 where  
 







A A B B BA BA
a
A A A B
G
G K
G G G G GG GX
G G G G
  
 − −   + + −+   = = −
  +
  
Substituting the results from (a.2) and (a.3) into (a.4), we have under symmetry the following:   
 
, , (4 3)(2 2 3)( ) 0
48
A
A M A PRa
a aA
X G G K
P P
G G





 (iii) Comparing the appropriation effect of arming: 
 
We evaluate 







          ( a.5)  
at 
, ,A PR B PRG G G= =   
 Since 
, , 1 3
A
A M A PR







= = − 
+ 
, then under symmetry  
 







        
The summation of the three effects leads to 
 
 
(4 3)(2 2 3) (4 3)(2 2 3) 5(4 3)(2 2 3)
0
288 48 288
G G K G G K G G K
G G G  
− + − − + − − + −
− + =   
The negative sign indicates that  
, ,A M A PRG G . Thus, a move from the protectionism regime to the multiple 
FTAs regime induces both of the adversary countries to reduce their optimal arming allocations since the 
export-revenue effects plus the resource-appropriation effect, which is the marginal revenue of arming, 
exceeds the output distortion effect, which is the marginal cost of arming.   
 
 C-3. Conflict intensity under single FTAs exceeds that under multiple FTAs. 
 
We will evaluate the slope of the 
,B SSW  under a single FTA at the equilibrium arming allocations under 
multiple FTAs. 
 
(i)  Comparing the export revenue effect 
We evaluate this expression 
, ,
, , , ,( ) ( )
B S B M
B S B S B M B Mb b
b b b bB B
P P
X Q X Q
G G
  
− − − 
  
  
at the point where  













= − − −
+




( 3) (2 )
2 ( )
B M A A A B
b B
B A B
P G G G G G
G G G











B B A A B
B BC S
b A B















(2 6) 3 3 2 2 2
      
3 ( )
B















− − − −
+=
− + + + + +
=
+
   
  
















After substituting the above equations into (a.6), we have under symmetry the following result: 
 
, ,
, , , , (4 3)(2 2 3)( ) ( )
288
B S B M
B S B S B M B Mb b
b b b bB B
P P G G K
X Q X Q
G G G
   − + −
− − − = 
  
   
 
(ii) Comparing the output-distortion effect of arming: 
 












           (a.7)  
at the point where  
, , ,A M B MG G G= =   
 noting that 
 








B B A A AA BB
b
B B A B
G
G K
G G G G GG GX
G G G G
 
 − −  + + −+  = = −
  +
  
Substituting the above equation (a.4), we have under symmetry the following:   
 
, , (4 3)(2 2 3)( )
48
B
B S B Mb
b bB
X G G K
P P
G G





(iii) Comparing the appropriation-effect of arming: 







 ( a.5) at  
, ,A PR B PRG G G= =   
Since 
, , 1 3
B
B M B S







= = − 
+ 
, then under symmetry  







                                                  




4 3 2 2 31 5
4 3 2 2 3 4 3 2 2 3 0
288 48 288
G G K
G G K G G K
G G G  
− + −
− + − − = − − + −   
The positive sign indicates that  
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, ,B S B MG G .  
A move from multiple FTAs to a single FTA regime induce the non-member country to increase its optimal 
arming since the export-revenue effects plus the resource-appropriation effect, which is the marginal 
revenue of arming is exceeds the output distortion effect, which is the marginal cost of arming. 
